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From the Editor…
Welcome to the Winter 2018 issue of the Journal of Transportation Management, being Vol. 28 No 2!  This
issue of the Journal starts with an article on, includes a second trucking related article on legal issues related
to truck safety, moves on drone usage in warehousing operations, and concludes with an article on the
likelihood of scheduled ocean container vessel shipping into and out of the Great Lakes.
Our first article examines the influence of temporal factors on motor carrier crash severity.              The
results indicate that crashes resulting in property damage are more likely to occur during the day and on
weekdays, however, that fatal and injury crashes are significantly more likely during nights and weekends.
The second article is a law review style piece that looks at what the FMCSA is really measuring with its use
of big data in safety fitness determinations, and the impact on due process. The author suggests that the
successive efforts of FMCSA and its predecessor agencies to measure safety and fitness based on mass
quantities of roadside inspection data are incapable of either accuracy or fairness.  The third manuscript
explores the feasibility of drone adoption and implementation in warehouses.  The authors conclude that
current unmanned warehouse drone technology offers the potential for significant efficiency gains both for
inventory handling and inventory transparency. The fourth article studies the feasibility of ocean shipping
container ships running scheduled services into and out of the Great Lakes.  The article concludes that such
services continue to be infeasible due to a number of factors that are reviewed.
At the Journal, we are continuing to make a number of changes that will improve the visibility of JTM, and
improve its position in the supply chain publishing world.  These include registering and updating journal
information with several publishing guides, and placing the past and current content on services that provide
visibility to Google Scholar.
I look forward to hearing from you our readers with questions, comments and article submissions.  The
submission guidelines are included at the end of this issue’s articles and I encourage both academics and
practitioners to consider submitting an article to the Journal.  Also included in this issue is a subscription form
and I hope you will subscribe personally, and/or encourage your libraries to subscribe.
John C. Taylor, Ph.D.
Editor, Journal of Transportation Management
Chair, Department of Marketing and SCM, Ilitch School of Business
Wayne State University
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NOTHING GOOD HAPPENS AFTER DARK:  THE INFLUENCE OF TEMPORAL FACTORS
ON MOTOR CARRIER CRASH SEVERITY
Misty Moody
TransCore
S. Scott Nadler
University of Central Arkansas
Doug Voss
University of Central Arkansas
ABSTRACT
Motor carrier safety is a topic of great importance for both industry and makers of public policy.
Regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), regularly publish
data detailing the circumstances surrounding roadway accidents.  FMCSA’s Large Truck and Bus Crash
Facts (LTBCF) data demonstrate an increase in accidents during daylight hours and on weekdays.
Roadway risks are ever-present but differ by time of day and day of the week.  These differences may
potentially engender crashes of different severities at different times.  This study analyzes FMCSA LTBCF
data to determine when crashes of different severities are more likely to occur.  Findings indicate that
crashes resulting in property damage are more likely to occur during the day and on weekdays. However,
fatal and injury crashes are significantly more likely during nights and weekends.  Recommendations to
improve safety outcomes are provided along with suggestions for future research.
INTRODUCTION
The trucking industry is crucial to US economic
success.  Over 70% of the nation’s freight moves by
truck (Trucking.org, 2017) and trucking
expenditures exceed that of the other four transport
modes combined (CSCMP, 2017). Given trucking’s
size and importance, it comes as no surprise that a
great deal of past research has been devoted to the
industry.  This research can be summarized into
three overarching areas:  operations and technology,
people, and regulatory compliance.
A review of the literature based on the operations
and technology perspective indicates that the
majority of the research in this area has focused on
topics such as carrier management (Hada and
Kleiner, 2000; Overstreet, Hanna, Byrde, Cegielski
and Hazen, 2013); cost control (Grimm, Corsi and
Jarrell, 1989; Thomas and Callan, 1992); carrier
productivity (Weber and Weber, 2004; Han, Corsi,
and Grimm, 2008; Boyer and Burks, 2009;
Villarreal, Garza-Reyes and Kumar, 2016); survival
techniques (Grimm, Corsi and Smith, 1993; Voss,
Cangelosi, Rubach and Nadler, 2011); and the
adoption of technology (Cantor, Corsi and Grimm,
2006; Keller, 2006; Cantor, Corsi and Grimm,
2009).  People oriented motor carrier research has
generally focused on truck driver management and
retention (Mejza, Barnard, Corsi and Keane, 2003;
Mello and Hunt, 2009; Nadler and Kros, 2014),
driver ethics (Douglas and Swartz, 2017),
workplace violence (Anderson, 2004), the use of
medical marijuana (Stringham, Allard, Knapp and
Minor, 2017); and driver health (Lemke and
Apostolopoulos, 2015; Hilliard, 2016; Olson,
Wipfli, Thompson, Elliot, Anger, Bodner, Hammer
and Perrin, 2016).
Interestingly, regulatory aspects of the motor carrier
industry have received little recent research
attention. Research in this area can be further
divided into two time frames: pre-2000 and the
impact of deregulation (Daicoff, 1988; Corsi,
Grimm, Smith and Smith, 1992; Jerman and
Journal of Transportation Management
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Anderson, 1994) and post 2000 (motor carrier
safety/security).  Safety/security studies of interest
include hours of service (Saltzman and Belzer,
2002), regulatory compliance (Flatow, 2000), the
adoption of safety processes (Huang, Jeffries,
Tolbert and Dainoff, 2017); and motor carrier
security (Chang and Wu, 2015; Boone, Skipper,
Murfield and Murfield, 2016).
Given the breadth and depth of the motor carrier
literature, most investigations of temporal factors
associated with safety have been limited to Federal
and state-level studies.  No recent business logistics
articles of which we are aware examine accident
probabilities and the temporal factors associated
with safety incidents. Studies exist related to the
temporal dimensions of motor carrier safety but few
academic articles in the business logistics space
analyze available data or offer useful conclusions to
motor carrier managers.  For instance, the subject
of motor carrier safety, as it relates to nights and
weekends, was hotly debated during recent
discussions related to federal hours of service
(HOS) regulations (FMCSA, 2017).  This debate
centered around a 2013 update to HOS regulations
that limited drivers’ ability to restart their 60/70 hour
clock.  This was accomplished by limiting drivers to
one “34-hour restart” every 168 hours and dictating
that this restart must include two nighttime periods
including the hours of 1AM to 5AM.  These
provisions were eventually stricken in part due to
trucking industry arguments that they forced drivers
to operate in rush-hour traffic, which increases
congestion and safety risk.  Second order impacts
with unintended consequences often occur when
new regulations are implemented and the cost/
benefits of these now repealed regulations are hotly
debated.
Of course, risks occur more frequently when a
subject is exposed to risk factors.  In a roadway
safety context, crash frequency is positively
correlated with miles driven and traffic congestion
(Knipling, 2009).  Mileage and traffic congestion
are greater during weekday, daylight hours (Hendrix
2002; ATRI 2014).  However, other factors
increase risk while driving on weekends and nights,
when roadways are populated with a larger number
of impaired automobile drivers (Knipling, 2009).
The National Highway Traffic and Safety
Administration (NHTSA, 2017) reported
automobile drivers were impaired by alcohol in 27%
of fatal light vehicle crashes.
Thankfully, most crashes are not fatal. Crashes are
usually less severe and result in injury and/or
property damage. However, no business logistics
work of which we are aware assesses crash severity
risk (e.g. fatal, injury, or property damage only) by
time of day (e.g. day v. night) or day of the week
(e.g. weekday v. weekend).  This study draws from
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA) data to explore the frequency and
probability of fatal, injury, or property damage
crashes by day of the week and time of day.
This study begins with a review of relevant literature
related to motor carrier safety.  The authors then
discuss the methodology used to explore differences
in crash severity by examining temporal factors.
Results are subsequently presented. The authors
then suggest implications for managers and how they
may use study findings to improve safety
performance. Limitations and implications for future
research are presented followed by concluding
remarks.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Motor vehicle crashes are an unfortunate reality in
modern society.  NHTSA (2017) reported that U.S.
roadway accidents killed 37,461 people in 2016, an
increase of 5.6% over 2015.   Of those killed, only
4,317 (11.5%) resulted from an accident involving a
large truck, and vehicles other than the truck are
predominantly at fault in these fatal incidents
(FMCSA, 2007). These statistics highlight the
importance of government and private investments
in roadway safety.
Investments in roadway safety are made in order to
mitigate the severe economic, physical, and
psychological harm caused by these incidents.
NHTSA (2014) calculated that motor vehicle
crashes cost the United States $871 billion a year.
This includes $277 billion in economic costs and
Vol. 28 No. 2 9
$594 billion from death, pain, and suffering.  The
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA, 2008) found that the cost of an accident
involving a large truck ranged between $334,892
and $7,633,600.  Given the high cost of safety
incidents, it is incumbent upon the motor carrier
industry to understand the conditions under which
most crashes occur.  Most truck crashes occur on
weekdays during daylight hours in clear conditions
on dry roads (Knipling, 2009).  There are three
primary risk factors contributing to motor vehicle
crashes: enduring driver characteristics (e.g. age,
medical conditions, and susceptibility to fatigue),
temporary driver characteristics (amount of sleep,
illness, or moodiness that may lead to aggressive
actions), and situational factors (e.g. traffic
congestion, weather, and maintenance problems)
(Knipling, 2009).  These factors are important
whether or not a truck is involved in the incident but,
given the skill required to operate a commercial
motor vehicle, their impact may be more
pronounced when incidents involve a truck.
Time of day and day of the week are related to each
of these factors.  Driver fatigue more commonly
manifests itself at night (Massie, Blower and
Campbell, 1997) and may result from enduring or
temporary driver characteristics.  Some people are
naturally more susceptible to fatigue and may have
medical conditions, such as sleep apnea, that
contribute to fatigued driving.  Fatal fatigue related
truck crashes generally involve only the offending
truck, which frequently leaves the road (Massie,
Blower and Campbell, 1997).  Traffic congestion is
more common during the day, particularly during
weekday rush hours, and is positively related to the
occurrence of safety incidents (Hendrix, 2002) as
85% of truck crashes involve other vehicles;
overwhelmingly cars (Knipling, 2009).  While night
and weekend roads are less congested, they are
more likely to be populated by impaired drivers.
The Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS),
undertaken as a collaboration between FMCSA
and NHTSA, examined 1,000 large truck crashes
between 2001 and 2003 and found that alcohol was
used by 9.0% of car drivers but only 0.3% of truck
drivers (FMCSA, 2007).  Hendrix (2002) found
the incidence of fatal light vehicle accidents begin
rising at 10PM and peaked around 3AM.
Knipling’s (2009) motor carrier safety textbook
posits that government and academic research have
neglected the importance of exposure data (e.g.
number and timing of miles driven) when assessing
roadway travel risk. The aforementioned literature
demonstrates that different risks occur at different
times and on different days.  Drivers choose the
hours of day in which to drive and must decide
when to expose themselves and their equipment to
roadway risks.  Knowing the likelihood that an
accident of a given severity will occur might help
them make more informed decisions.  This work
draws from FMCSA data to explore whether fatal,
injury, or property only crashes are more likely to
happen during the daylight or night and weekday or
weekend.  Conclusions are supported using the
odds ratio, a technique advocated by Knipling
(2009), to assess the likelihood a given risk will
result in certain outcomes.
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
FMCSA was established within the Department of
Transportation (DOT) on January 1, 2000
(FMCSA, 2014). At that time, the FMCSA was
tasked with commercial driver licensing, data and
analysis, regulatory compliance and enforcement,
research, technology, and safety assistance
activities. Ultimately, the FMCSA’s stated mission is
to prevent commercial motor vehicle related
fatalities and injuries (FMCSA, 2014).  In an effort
to educate the public, the FMCSA has published
the Large Truck and Bus Crash Facts (LTBCF)
analysis annually since 2010. LTBCF compiles
descriptive statistics pertaining to truck crashes of
different severities and draws from four major
sources of information: NHTSA’s Fatality Analysis
Reporting System (FARS), NHTSA’s General
Estimates System (GES), FMCSA’s Motor Carrier
Management Information System (MCMIS), and
Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA) highway
statistics (FMCSA, 2017). This study utilizes
LTBCF data from 2011 – 2015, which is the most
recent year available.  FMCSA requires accidents
to be reported that involve a truck, bus, or any
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vehicle displaying a hazardous materials placard, if
one of these vehicles was involved in a crash while
operating on a roadway customarily open to the
public, or if the accident resulted in fatality, injury or
tow-away (FMCSA, 2015).  When attempting to
understand why these accidents occur and how to
prevent them one must first understand when they
occur.  LTBCF data from 2015 are provided in
Tables 1 and 2 below as an example.   The
information contained in Table 1 provides a
comparison of the time of day in which accidents
occurred and the severity of those accidents.
Table 1 demonstrates that fatal, injury, and property
damage only accident rates are not uniformly
distributed throughout the day.  Rather, the
occurrence of each type of accident is more or less
normally distributed with the majority occurring
between peak driving hours of 6AM and 6PM.
Each year from 2011-2015 exhibited similar
characteristics.  Table 2 compares days of the week
in which accidents occurred and the severity of
those accidents.
Table 2 demonstrates that accident rates are not
uniformly distributed throughout the week.
Accidents of all severities occur more frequently
during the work week and less frequently on the
weekends. Each year from 2011-2015 exhibited
similar characteristics.
LTBCF data demonstrate a directional difference,
with more of each accident severity category
occurring during daylight hours and during the week.
This would lead one to believe that accidents of any
severity are more likely to occur on weekdays
during daylight hours.    However, this may be
deceiving as it does not control for exposure.  More
people are driving during the day and during
weekdays. More accidents occur as more people
are driving.  This is true for two basic reasons.
First, as roads become more crowded, more
vehicles are compressed into a given space.  As
compression increases, proximity between vehicles
decreases, and the chance of contact between
vehicles increases.  Second, each driver has a given
risk of being involved in an accident based on skill,
mechanical factors, and other issues.  For example,
driver skill and accident risk would be inversely
proportional.  Even the most skilled drivers with the
most mechanically sound vehicles bear some
accident risk.  As more people drive, more
accidents will occur due to exposure to the accident
risks of all drivers with whom the road is shared.
Therefore, more people on the road leads to more
accidents due to 1) greater compression and 2)
more driving participants, which leads to more
accidents due to exposure.
Vol. 28 No. 2
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Focusing on fatal accidents in 2015, Table 1
indicates that 2,342 fatal accidents occurred in the
daytime compared to 1,256 at night. However,
more daytime traffic engenders more accidents.
The question remains, if you are involved in an
accident, is this accident more likely to be fatal
(injury, or property damage only) during the day or
night?  To answer this question, we must control for
exposure.
Optimally, we would control for exposure by
comparing the number of accidents per million miles
driven (for example) on each day of the week/at
each time of day.  LTBCF does not provide this
data.  Given this, we chose to control for exposure
by comparing a) the percentage of daytime fatal
(injury, property damage only) accidents as a
percentage of total daytime accidents to b) the
percentage of nighttime fatal (injury, property
damage only) accidents as a percentage of total
nighttime accidents.  Given that more of all accident
types occur in daytime, comparing percentages
affords a standardized measure to determine
whether the likelihood of a fatal (injury, property
damage only) accident is greater in day or night.
Summing all accident severity types in Table 1
across all daytime hours reveals 334,342 total
daytime accidents; 2,342 of which were fatal (7%).
Following the same procedure for nighttime crashes
reveals 80,256 nighttime crashes; 1,250 of which
were fatal (16%).  Percentages were derived in a
similar fashion for daytime and nighttime injury and
property damage only crashes as well as weekday
v. weekend fatal, injury, and property only
accidents.
Percentages from 2011 – 2015 were combined,
coded, and analyzed using ANOVA to determine if
significant differences exist in the number of fatal,
injury, and property only accidents that occur in the
day v. night.  Observations were coded as DAY if
the accident occurred from 6AM – 6PM.
Observations were coded as NIGHT if the accident
occurred from 6PM – 6AM.  This yielded a total of
20 DAY and 20 NIGHT observations (n = 40) for
each accident severity type.  Results for time of day
x accident severity type are presented in Table 3.
Results indicate significant differences for all three
types of crash severity.  The mean column
represents the percentage of all crashes during that
time period that resulted in a given crash severity
outcome.  Of all the nighttime crashes, 2.16%
resulted in a fatality. Fatal crashes make up a
significantly larger percentage of all nighttime
crashes than they do daytime crashes.  (F = 42.317;
p £ 0.01).  Of all the nighttime crashes, 24.20%
resulted in injury.  Injury crashes comprise a
significantly larger percentage of all nighttime
crashes than they do daytime crashes (F = 11.135;
p £ 0.01).  Of all daytime crashes, 78.48% result in
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property damage only.  Property damage only
crashes make up a significantly larger percentage of
all daytime crashes than they do nighttime crashes
(F = 16.520; p £ 0.01).
__________________________________________________________
Following the same procedure utilized in the day v.
night comparison, percentages for 2011 – 2015
were combined, coded, and analyzed using
ANOVA to determine if significant differences exist
in the number of fatal, injury, and property only
accidents that occur on weekdays v. weekends.
Observations were coded as WEEKDAY if the
accident occurred from Monday to Friday.
Observations were coded as WEEKEND if the
accident occurred from Saturday – Sunday.  This
yielded a total of 25 WEEKDAY and 10
WEEKEND observations (n = 35) for each
accident severity type.  Results for day of the week
x accident severity type are presented in Table 4.
Results indicate significant differences across all
three types of crash severity.  Of all the weekend
accidents, 1.49% resulted in fatality.  Fatal accidents
make up a significantly larger percentage of all
weekend accidents than they do weekday accidents
(F = 47.528; p £  0.01).  Of all the weekend
accidents, 23.94% result in injury.  Injury crashes
comprise a significantly larger percentage of all
weekend accidents than they do weekday accidents
(F = 8.112; p £ 0.01).  Of all the weekday crashes,
78.15% result in property damage only.  Property
damage only crashes comprise a larger percentage
of all weekday crashes than they do weekend
crashes (F = 10.082; p £ 0.01).
Given the small sample size utilized in the analyses
presented heretofore, we utilized the odds ratio
technique to further support our findings.  Knipling
(2009, p. 50) advocates the use of odds ratios and
Vol. 28 No. 2 13
describes them as, “…a derived statistic that
estimates the relative risks of a crash [severity type]
based on some other factor of interest [day v. night
or weekday v. weekend].”
Knipling (2009, p. 50) provides an example of an
odds ratio in use.  Suppose a motor carrier with
100 drivers wishes to determine the impact of sleep
apnea on accident frequency.  Over a period of
time, 11 company drivers were involved in
accidents.  Out of these 11 drivers it was
determined that 6 had sleep apnea and 5 did not.
Computing the odds ratio of crash involvement in
this scenario requires comparing the odds of being
in a crash for those who have sleep apnea to those
who do not.  The company is said to have 26
drivers with sleep apnea, 6 of whom were involved
in an accident.  This leaves 74 drivers without sleep
apnea, 5 of whom were involved in an accident.
Knipling (2009) structures the aforementioned
scenario as follows:
Sleep apnea odds ratio =  6/20  =  0.30   =  4.1
                                            5/69      0.07
In this example, the odds of an accident given that a
driver has sleep apnea is 4.1.  Values greater than
1.0 indicate greater risk is associated with the
factor.  Values less than 1.0 indicate less risk
associated with the factor.  Greater deviations from
1.0 indicate more/less risk.
Tables 3 and 4 indicate that accidents are more
likely to be fatal or injurious on nights and
weekends.  Therefore, we placed night and
weekend data in the numerator indicating it is the
risk factor for which the odds ratio is quantifying.
The odds ratio calculation for 2015 weekend v.
2015 Weekend v. Weekday Fatal Accident
=  Total Fatal Weekend Accidents/(Total Weekend Accidents – Total Fatal Weekend Accidents)
    Total Fatal Weekday Accidents/(Total Weekday Accidents – Total Fatal Weekday Accidents)
=     598/(47,598 – 598)        =    1.54
    3,000/(367,000 – 3,000)
weekday fatal crashes is provided below as an
example.
Results for 2011 – 2015 are presented in Table 5.
Results presented in Table 5 indicate that fatal
accidents are more likely to occur on nights and
weekends for each year from 2011 – 2015.  Injury
accidents were more likely to occur on nights and
weekends in 2015, 2013, and 2012 as well as
weekends in 2011.  Injury accidents were less likely
to occur on nights and weekends in 2014 and less
likely to occur on nights in 2011.  Property damage
was less likely to occur on nights and weekends in
2015, 2013, 2012, and 2011.  Property damage
was more likely to occur on nights and weekends in
2014.
IMPLICATIONS
Results presented in this study indicate statistically
significant differences between the likelihood of
different accident severities across nights v. days
and weekends v. weekdays as a function of the total
accidents that occur in each time period.  As a
percentage of total accidents during a respective
time period, accidents involving a fatality or injury
are more likely to occur on nights and weekends.
Accidents involving property damage only are more
likely to occur on days and weekdays. These results
may have important managerial implications.
Roadway traffic congestion is greatest during
weekday daylight hours and especially in peak, rush
hour drive time (ATRI, 2014). Over the road
commercial motor vehicles are often compensated
on a per mile basis.  Congestion reduces the number
of miles a truck can travel in a given period of time.
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Sharing the road with fewer drivers is also
perceived to improve safety.  Therefore, drivers’
common sense often dictates a preference to
operate on nights and weekends in the interest of
maximizing compensation and perceived safety
performance.
Raw FMCSA data demonstrate that a larger
number of accidents, regardless of severity, occur
on weekday days.  A disproportionate number of
these accidents result in property damage without
injury or fatality.  However, outcomes differ when
controlling for exposure (e.g. the total number of
accidents).  In this context, our results indicate that
accidents occurring at night or on weekends are
significantly more likely to result in death or injury
compared to accidents that occur during the day.
Accidents occurring during the day or on weekdays
are significantly more likely to result in property
damage only.
Counterintuitively, traffic congestion may actually
reduce accident severity.  Newton’s second law
states that force is a function of mass and
acceleration.  Force increases as the speed of an
object with a given mass increases.  Greater force
increases accident severity.  Congestion slows traffic
(ATRI, 2014) and, therefore, reduces the force
involved in accidents that occur.  Therefore,
congestion may also reduce accident severity during
day and weekdays as demonstrated in our study.
Decreased congestion allows trucks to travel at
higher average speeds.  Higher speeds allow trucks
to increase daily revenue.  However, should an
accident occur, higher speeds increase accident
severity.  Increased speed may contribute to the
increased severity of night and weekend accidents.
The population of inebriated drivers also increases
on nights and weekends.  Commercial truck drivers
are not often found to be under the influence of
alcohol when a fatal accident occurs.  NHTSA
reported that 2.7% of commercial truck fatal
crashes involved alcohol use by the truck driver.
Car drivers were impaired by alcohol in 27% of
fatal light vehicle crashes (NHTSA, 2017).  Blower
(1998) studied driver error in accidents involving
cars and large trucks.  Results indicate that the car
driver was at fault in 71% of accidents.  The
increased presence of impaired car drivers during
night and weekend hours likely increases truck
accident severity.
Drivers should consider these results when planning
their trips.  Drivers should not take advantage of
decreased congestion and travel at unsafe speeds.
Caution should be taken to maintain speeds that are
safe for conditions. Drivers should also more
carefully weigh the tradeoffs of exposure as it relates
to day v night and weekday v. weekend driving.
Reduced congestion inherent to night and weekend
driving increases profitability, but there is also a
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significantly increased risk of fatal or injurious
accident during these times when compared to days
and weekdays.
Safety managers should also consider exposure
when setting company policy.  Any safety incident is
detrimental.  However, insurance carriers often
dictate safety managers reduce certain types of
incidents (e.g. property damage, injury only, or
catastrophic fatality losses).  Safety managers may
use the principals of exposure explained heretofore
as a lever to influence safety outcomes.  Given an
overabundance of past property damage or injury
only incidents, safety managers may wish to control
for excess exposure to other vehicles and encourage
drivers to operate at night or on weekends.
However, if faced with the need to reduce
catastrophic losses, safety managers may encourage
drivers to operate during the day or on weekdays.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This study is faced with several limitations.  First,
real-time information cannot be gleaned from the
FMCSA LTBCF data due to the two-year delay in
its release. However, given the relative stability of
accident severity odds ratios presented in Table 5, it
is likely that our findings remain applicable today.
Next, secondary data was used in this study. The
validity of our results is subject to the practices of
those who collect and code the LTBCF data.
Finally, small sample sizes employed in our analysis
inhibit generalizability. Future investigations should
seek to collect more data or obtain larger datasets.
Future investigations should also uncover reasons
behind increased night and weekend accident
severity.  We posit that increased speed and
impaired light vehicle drivers play a significant role.
However, LTBCF data do not contain information
that would allow us to substantiate this theory.
Data limitations also prevented the examination of
covariates.  Our results would imply that accidents
are most severe on weekend nights.  Future
research should examine this possibility.
Motor carrier safety research is relatively lacking in
the business logistics literature. The large volume of
available, secondary data makes this a potentially
fruitful area for further inquiry.  Researchers wishing
to collect primary data may wish to define a new
“driver deviance” construct and assess its impact on
safety performance.  Deviant behavior (e.g. such as
speeding, poor maintenance practices, and log book
violations) have been shown to influence safety
outcomes.  This research should seek to uncover
characteristics of drivers that are more likely to
result in bad behavior, and how these drivers can be
avoided in the hiring process.
CONCLUSIONS
Safety is of paramount importance to motor carrier
operations.  However, safety is multi-faceted and
not easily achieved. Drivers must operate in a safe
manner.  Management must put drivers in a position
to operate safely by, for instance, scheduling
delivery appointments that can be legally achieved in
accordance with posted speed limits and Federal
HOS regulations.  Drivers must also be aware and
wary of those with whom they share the road.
Our results demonstrate that safety outcomes differ
by time of day and day of the week.  However, the
clock and calendar do not determine roadway
safety.  Safety outcomes are primarily determined
by human choices.  These choices differ by the
temporal factors examined herein. These temporal
factors are but a small subset of those contributing
to the thousands of deaths that occur annually on
American roads.  Safety is a shared responsibility
and one that is equally important at every hour on
every day.
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SAFETY FITNESS DETERMINATIONS:
WHAT IS FMCSA MEASURING?
Big Data and Regulatory “Improv” are Drowning Due Process1(Endnotes)
Mark J. Andrews
Clark Hill Strasburger
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INTRODUCTION
This article reports on a topic assigned to a recent
legal conference panel that discussed safety fitness
determinations for motor carriers.  The assigned topic,
focused on safety fitness determinations, big data, and
due process; begs the question of whether the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA or the
Agency) is measuring anything that’s really relevant to
the “safety” or “fitness” of a motor carrier of passengers
or property to operate on the Nation’s highways.  Even
if FMCSA thinks it is measuring safety or fitness, the
more important question is whether those
measurements are accurate or fair.  I submit that the
successive efforts of FMCSA and its predecessor
agencies to measure safety and fitness based on mass
quantities of roadside inspection data are incapable
of either accuracy or fairness.  This is true of the
methodology known as Compliance, Safety,
Responsibility (CSA) and was true of its SAFESTAT
predecessor before 2010.  The same will be true if
FMCSA ever tries to implement the recommendations
of the National Academies of Sciences (NAS) for
vastly expanded data collection as envisioned in the
Item Response Theory (IRT).
Those three methodologies share the following flaws:
 the “big data” gathered is “bad data” for comparison
purposes, because of the patchwork of performance
standards used by law enforcement in 50 States;
 this “big data” is paradoxically not “big enough” due
to the small sample sizes typically gathered for small
carriers; and
  FMCSA has no track record of consistency or
competence in managing and analyzing “big data” as
part of its current programs, let alone in handling the
mathematical complexities that would be inherent in
IRT analysis.
The Agency’s history of data mismanagement has been
well-documented in the context of the Safety
Measurement System (SMS) developed under CSA.
But if we look beyond past history with SMS, the
same problems threaten to cripple the Agency’s future
response to other regulatory issues in the supply chain.
FMCSA is still struggling with the basic task of writing
computer code to support the Unified Registration
System (URS) it unveiled as a “final rule” in 2013.  It
has yet to comply with literally dozens of mandates
under the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act,
Pub.L. 114-94 (FAST Act) for procedural reform in
areas that include but are not limited to SMS.  Thus it
is ill-equipped to analyze emerging regulatory issues
ranging from crash preventability to the safety of “last
mile” delivery operators.  Instead, the Agency too often
flounders from one issue to the next, substituting
evanescent “guidance” for predictable rules.  These
issues of poor data quality, small sample sizes, data
mismanagement, institutional “innumeracy” (look it up)
and regulatory improvisation pose existential threats
to administrative due process, as will be developed in
more detail below.
ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUE
By now an ample body of evidence has been
presented to FMCSA, to the United States
Department of Transportation (USDOT) and to
Congress regarding the defects of SAFESTAT and
SMS methodology.2  This evidence comes from federal
watchdog agencies, from academic studies and even
from NAS in its review of SMS under the FAST Act.
The major shortcomings of roadside inspections as a
surrogate for safety fitness are detailed in Attachment 1.
Those shortcomings include:
 State by state disparities in safety enforcement
policies mean that SMS scores largely depend on
Big Data =  Good Data
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where a carrier operates, not on the inherent safety of
those operations.
 The Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) has
stated that the roadside inspections undergone by small
motor carriers typically fail to yield sufficient sample
sizes to reflect the overall safety of such fleets over
time.
 The “law of large numbers” ensures that an occasional
bad inspection will cause much more severe
fluctuations in the SMS score for a small fleet than for
a larger one.
 The impact of a bad inspection is magnified by
widespread under-reporting of “clean” inspections.
 The Agency’s 800-plus “enhancements” of SMS
methodology since its launch in 2010 detract from the
predictability and usefulness of its performance
standards, and have ignored established procedures
for due process in rulemaking.
 Most importantly, the percentile scores generated
by SMS from roadside inspection data fail to predict
the actual crash history of individual motor carriers.
Numerous crash-free carriers within the artificial peer
groupings created under SMS suffer from guilt by
association due to “averaging of averages” with regard
to aggregate performance levels.
Bigger Data =  Better Data
Although the NAS report recognizes many of the SMS
statistical problems described above, its proposed
solution is essentially “more of the same.”  The
proposed IRT model would vastly expand the amount,
type and complexity of data gathered from motor
carriers, to include competitively sensitive data such
as method and amount of compensation, type of cargo
transported, and driver turnover.  The additional costs
of gathering and analyzing such additional data are
likely to be compounded by industry resistance to
providing it in the first place.
In addition, fundamental legal issues are raised by two
recommendations in the NAS Report (at p.5), to the
effect that an IRT model should “allow for the addition
of new safety measures as they become available,
without having to start from scratch” and should “adapt
to changes in safety over time.”  These
recommendations would exacerbate the worst feature
of SMS from a due-process standpoint – the
constantly moving targets resulting from its endless
“enhancements” of the scoring system.  With or without
the IRT overlay, SMS cannot become the basis for
definitive safety fitness determinations as long as its
criteria are subject to constant revision without prior
notice and opportunity for comment.  While it may be
understandable that the statisticians authoring the NAS
report were not aware of the due process requirements
for making and changing rules under the Administrative
Procedure Act, FMCSA has no such excuse.
Can FMCSA Handle Big Data?
When FMCSA requested public comments on the
NAS report last year, it targeted a December 2017
release date for a “Corrective Action Plan” in response
to NAS.  At this writing in April 2018, we’re still
waiting – but this observer is not surprised.  With due
respect and regret, it must be said that FMCSA is
barely able to maintain the data bases and IT systems
supporting its current activities, let alone address the
complexities or IRT.
The five-year debacle that is URS already has been
mentioned.  Last summer, two federal watchdogs
renewed their criticisms of data management by
FMCSA.  The USDOT Inspector General stated in
Report No. ST2017065 (July 25, 2017) that the
Agency needed “to address its quality assurance
processes and compliance review data limitations.”
Similarly, a GAO report (No. GAO-17-488, July 13,
2017) called on FMCSA to modernize legacy IT
systems, including development of “well-defined goals,
strategies, measures and timelines.”  More recently,
the Agency’s online registry of certified medical
examiners for drivers was hacked on December 1,
2017 and remained out of service more than three
months later (Transport Topics, March 19, 2018, pp.
1, 47).  Perhaps it is time for FMCSA to borrow IT
staff from sister agencies such as the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics in order to upgrade its data
management.
9990390.1/SP/00005/0034/051818
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The above background casts serious doubt on the
feasibility of implementing the abstruse IRT model.  In
all likelihood, that model would turn out to be an even
costlier and more data-intensive version of SMS.
Considering that SMS is still riddled with statistical,
logical and legal defects after eight years of
“enhancements,” adding an IRT overlay would amount
to throwing good money after bad.  Isn’t it time for
FMCSA to consider alternative ways of fulfilling the
statutory mandate (see 49 U.S.C. § 31144(a)) that
actual safety fitness determinations be assigned to all
532,000 truck and bus fleets it regulates?  One such
alternative would be to expand desktop audits, now
used by FMCSA for “new entrant” carriers, into a
fee-based program linked to the periodic MCS-150
updates now required for all fleets.  Details of this
proposal, including follow-up site visits as warranted,
have been spelled out for FMCSA in comments
repeatedly filed for coalitions represented by myself
and my co-panelist Hank Seaton, whose contributions
to the analysis underlying this paper have been
significant and are valued by the author.
CONCLUSION:
BEYOND SMS, NAS, IRT AND THE FAST
ACT
FMCSA’s unfinished business under the FAST Act is
not limited to dealing with the NAS report.  Wholly
aside from the FAST Act mandates still facing FMCSA
with regard to safety fitness issues and administrative
procedures generally, the industry is facing many other
regulatory challenges necessitating improved IT and
data management at FMCSA.  These issues include:
 Misuse of flawed SMS data by the plaintiffs’ bar in
accident cases.
 Crash “preventability” determinations in FMCSA
mini-trials.
 How to regulate the safety of “last mile” deliveries,
especially in vehicles too small for coverage under
FMCSA safety regulations.
 How the hours-of-service regulations in 49 C.F.R.
Part 395 might be adapted to take account of emerging
research on fatigue management.
 Whether and how to modify Part 395 in view of the
increasing economic toll of vehicle detention and the
onset of electronic logging.
 Whether the emerging issue of salvage for food
shipments should be jointly addressed by FMCSA
and the Food & Drug Administration (FDA).in view
of shipper claims that the “actual loss” standards of
the Carmack Amendment (49 U.S.C. § 14706) are
changed by “adulteration” provisions in new FDA
regulations on sanitary food transportation (21 C.F.R.
Part 1).
 And finally, how to reform FMCSA procedures to
allow independent administrative review of safety
fitness determinations to at least the extent now
available for civil penalties with less severe commercial
impacts.
Attachment 1:
Excerpt from Comments of MCRR Coalition in
Docket FMCSA-2017-0226
1 Editor’s Note
– This article is written in a law review style and
advocates a particular positon as is common in law
review articles.  The article has been formatted for
the journal’s style but the references are not in
JTM’s typical style.  The Journal does not take a
position on the points made by the author.
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(Footnotes)
1 See, e.g., comments filed with FMCSA on
September 27, 2017 by a coalition (for which your
author and co-panelist Hank Seaton served as
counsel) in response to the NAS study of SMS.  A
full copy of that filing can be viewed at https://
www.regulations.gov/document?D=FMCSA-2017-
0226-0014 .  An excerpt from it is reproduced in
Attachment 1  to this paper.
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IV. Responses to Federal Register notice
In the following discussion, Commenters will address the NAS recommendations set out in the Agency’s
August 28 Federal Register notice. In doing so, Commenters will point out that no corrective action plan
can be confined to these recommendations in light of the analysis of the FAST Act and the limitations of the
systemically flawed SMS.
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A. Recommendation 1 – Item Response
Theory Model
Systemic flaws that undermine SMS
methodology would plague any statistical
model based on the same data – even the NAS
panel’s proposed IRT approach
After spending 10 years in its development,
FMCSA has made more than 800 changes to its
safety weighting procedures and its convoluted
algorithms in an effort to “improve” the accuracy of
its system. Yet the Agency has failed to address
systemic flaws that Commenters have consistently
presented but that have been ignored.
The NAS Report expresses a belief that introducing
more types of data and using a more rigorous
mathematical formula to interpret and normalize the
data will result in more accurate and reliable scoring
among the carriers than is currently available under
SMS. In particular, Chapter 2 of the NAS Report
acknowledges many current deficiencies of SMS
and concedes that most of them are not readily
fixed. The report fails to recognize, however, that
similar flaws would pervade its proposed IRT
model, which would try to predict crash risk by
crunching even more gargantuan amounts of data
using algorithms even more complex than those of
SMS.
Although the MCRR Coalition will not explore the
systemic flaws of SMS in detail at this point, we
believe a brief recap is necessary to show issues not
fully addressed in the NAS Report’s support of the
IRT Model. As we have established in previous
submissions to FMCSA1, SMS suffers from at least
seven systemic flaws:
· Insufficient data
· The law of small numbers
· Misuse of average crash rates
· Misuse of crash data
· State-by-State enforcement inconsistencies
· Peer group creep
· Profiling
· Enforcement biases
Insufficient Data
Although FMCSA has now withdrawn its misguided
SFD Proposal, it bears noting that the Agency in
that docket could identify a mere 262 carriers as
unfit using data alone. The principal reason is that
there simply isn’t enough data to establish reliable
metrics on the vast majority of motor carriers.
Evidence of insufficient data is extensive, but just a
few points will suffice here: Based on our analysis of
the 24-month SMS snapshot for August 2017,
among the 532,000 active U.S. interstate motor
carriers:
· 39.6% had no inspections
· Just 7.5% had 20 or more total inspections
– the minimum threshold of data sufficiency
recommended by GAO for individual
BASICs
· 83.7% do not have the minimum number of
inspections with violations to be considered
in any of the five public SMS BASICs even
under FMCSA’s inadequate data sufficiency
thresholds2
The Driver Fitness and Controlled Substances/
Alcohol BASICs each capture fewer than 1 percent
of active U.S. motor carriers. Meanwhile, the
Unsafe Driving and Hours-of-Service Compliance
BASICs have seen and will continue to see major
declines in data sufficiency. The Unsafe Driving
BASIC suffers from the huge decline over the past
decade in traffic enforcement (“TE”) inspections,
which are the sole source of data for this BASIC.
As seen in Figure APP-1 these inspections peaked
in 2006 and have since dropped 59.6%. TE
inspections are down 37.4% since the year
FMCSA implemented CSA. The drop in TE
inspections has leveled off, but there are no signs of
a rebound.
Likewise, the growth in popularity of electronic
logging among larger carriers apparently has starved
the HOS Compliance BASIC of many data points
previously collected at roadside, and this trend
should become even more pronounced once the
electronic logging device mandate is fully
implemented. The ELD mandate could help correct
a different systemic flaw in SMS – enforcement bias
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– and of course should improve compliance with the
HOS regulations. But it could also render the HOS
Compliance BASIC obsolete.
Given these trends, even under FMCSA’s clearly
inadequate current standards of data sufficiency, the
Vehicle Maintenance BASIC – in which just 12% of
carriers meet the minimum
threshold – could become the only BASIC with
anything remotely approaching a meaningful amount
of data, albeit with a preponderance of low-value
violations. (See “Enforcement biases” below.)
However, applying the data sufficiency standard
recommended by GAO, SMS basically disappears
except, arguably, as a tool for monitoring large
carriers. This is a systemic flaw that FMCSA is
powerless to rectify and that would plague any
statistical model.
Law of Small Numbers
The law of small numbers is in large part a function
of data insufficiency. As has been widely recognized,
SMS metrics become extremely volatile as the
number of data points drops. This is the same
phenomenon – small sample size – that leads
baseball fans to pay little attention to early-season
batting averages. As noted above, GAO concluded
that SMS metrics could be reliable only at a higher
data sufficiency standard of at least 20 observations.
Although the NAS Report does not refer explicitly
to the law of small numbers, it is quite clear
regarding the impact of the phenomenon. We quote
the following again for emphasis:
There is no getting around the point that
providing BASIC measures to carriers that
have very infrequent inspections will result in
highly variable assessments of such carriers.
This is simply because not much is known
about the frequency of violations for small
carriers. Such high variance measures can
result in mischaracterizing the nature of a
carrier—the high variability could result in
the carrier being given alerts more or less
often than what would be warranted given
its behavior. On the other hand, the industry
is highly skewed, being comprised of a very
large number of small carriers. If the data
sufficiency standards were raised, a high
percentage of the industry would be
excluded from measurement by SMS and
therefore monitoring by FMCSA. We
believe that this issue should be further
investigated. (NAS Report, p. 46)
Journal of Transportation Management26
But while the NAS Report recognizes the law of
small numbers and acknowledges GAO’s argument
on data sufficiency, it basically passes the buck to
FMCSA to make a policy decision and argues that
the IRT model “will have some ability to reduce the
variance of these measures through the use of
smoothing with the measures of a carrier’s peers.”
NAS Report, p. 46
Commenters submit that “some ability” to reduce
variances is hardly a fix for this systemic flaw, which
cannot be merely shrugged off given its impact on
small carriers and the NAS panel’s inability to
identify the new data to be surveyed, let alone its
quantity or its predictive accuracy.
Misuse of Average Crash Rates
A similar problem relates to how FMCSA misuses
the data in formulating regulatory and enforcement
policy. Our Coalition has consistently challenged the
Agency’s use of average carrier performance to
make sweeping claims that do not describe the
reality of individual carriers. We submitted the
following graphs (Figure APP-2) as part of our
comments filed in July 2012 in Docket No.
FMCSA-2012-0074 and again in May 2016 in
response to the SFD Proposal (Docket No.
FMCSA-2015-0001). These graphs show
FMCSA’s regression of average crash rates for
carriers in the Fatigued Driving (now HOS
Compliance) and Unsafe Driving BASICs
compared to a plot of the individual carriers’ crash
rates.
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The upshot is that SMS is not remotely predictive of
individual carriers’ safety performance where it
matters most – i.e., crashes. As discussed earlier,
this flaw lies at the very heart of what Congress
wanted to address in the NAS correlation study.
Both the Agency and the NAS panel have been
presented with this study and have not addressed
the issue. In fact, in their response to the Agency’s
NPRM in 2016, Commenters demonstrated this
regression of averages when applied to peer group
percentiles misidentified 53% of profiled carriers
who had no crashes during the review period as
“bad actors” warranting unfit ratings.
Crash Data
The SMS structure traditionally has depended upon
counting all reported accidents without any
scrubbing for “preventability,” let alone for causation
or – even more appropriate – for absence of carrier
compliance with safety regulations resulting in
causation. DataQ simply does not work since the
Agency insists on publishing data under a
“presumed guilty until proven innocent” basis. And it
does not determine causation, nor can it at less than
prohibitive cost. The light scrubbing the Agency now
offers for preventability determinations – in very
limited scenarios as part of its two-year pilot
program – cannot possibly offer a remedy for small
carriers unlucky enough to be caught up in accidents
that were not their fault.
Multiple studies have shown that most fatal car-
truck crashes are not the result of actions by the
commercial motor vehicle driver.3 FMCSA’s annual
Large Truck and Bus Crash Facts publication
consistently shows essentially the same breakdowns
with around 84% to 86% of passenger vehicle
drivers being cited for driver factors and only 26%
to 35% of truck drivers cited with driver factors.4
Regarding crash preventability, the NAS Report is
equivocal. It lists (at pp. 48-50) several factors that
would complicate a proposal to set aside non-
preventable crashes. On the other hand, the report
acknowledges that including non-preventable
crashes is potentially misleading because any carrier
placed in the same situation would have crashed,
meaning that the crash is simply a consequence of
circumstances, not carrier or driver misdeed. “This
is an important issue, especially for small carriers,
since such events can be extremely damaging,
possibly putting some small carriers out of
business.” NAS Report, p. 48. As is evidenced
elsewhere in the report, the NAS panel seems
willing to shrug off the problem, and live with a
system that it acknowledges is grossly unfair to small
carriers.
Inconsistent Enforcement
A system that compares carriers operating under
different state regimes cannot be justified,
particularly when the evidence shows significant
variation in enforcement prerogatives by state. For
example, commenters have long demonstrated that
enforcement anomalies distort any effort to
normalize or compare speeding violations among
carriers that operate in different areas. Consider
Figure APP-3 below, which shows that Indiana –
accounting for about 3% of commercial vehicle
miles each year – writes up 10% of all reported
commercial vehicle moving violations nationwide.5
Neighboring state Michigan accounts for slightly
more than 5% of the moving violations but less than
2% of the miles. Among the top 10 states in moving
violations, five – Indiana, Michigan, Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Ohio – are in the Great Lakes
region. Carriers that operate in western states
inevitably have better Unsafe Driving scores than
carriers that operate in the Midwest.
Disparate enforcement also is evidenced by
differences in the number of inspections. Together,
Texas and California represent more than 40% of
inspections conducted by state personnel, excluding
federal inspections at the border. While those two
states are by far the nation’s largest in terms of
commercial vehicle miles traveled, their share of
inspections far exceeds their share of vehicle miles,
which combined is about 20%.
While it is true that the high level of freight activity in
these two states naturally calls for more inspections
than in, say, the Plains or Mountain West, SMS
methodology does not consider regional differences.
For example, in 2016, Maryland ranked fifth in the
number of state inspections at 3.28% of the total,
but only 30th in the number of commercial vehicle
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miles traveled. New Mexico is seventh in
inspections but only 19th in the number of
commercial vehicle miles. On the other hand, Ohio
ranks fourth in commercial vehicle miles but only
13th in inspections. And Louisiana is 13th in
commercial vehicle miles but 27th in inspections.
The NAS report suggests that an IRT-based model
could help adjust for enforcement disparities.
Maybe a model could be created to simulate a
more even distribution of enforcement activities, but
the result would be just that: a model. The
potentially devastating impact on carriers of relative
metrics – especially if made public – is too great to
be based on complex calculated projections rather
than actual on-road results. Once again, the NAS
Report effectively shrugs off an existential threat to
small carriers who find themselves in the wrong
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place at the wrong time – especially when crash
causation and the law of small numbers are factored
in.
Peer Group Creep
Commenters have long pointed out the distortions of
SMS metrics that can result from carriers’ shifts
among safety event groups, especially as small
carriers with volatile metrics ease into a slightly
larger peer group. We are heartened, therefore, by
the NAS report’s recognition of this phenomenon
and even somewhat encouraged by FMCSA’s initial
response on the topic. See 82 Fed. Reg. at 40831.
However, Commenters contend that peer group
creep is a bigger problem than FMCSA concedes.
We believe FMCSA’s suggestion “that the
methodology should be revised so that a safety
event that is not a violation or a crash is not the sole
reason for an increased measure or percentile” is
too narrow. Even if an inspection that includes a
violation kicks a carrier into a more stringent safety
event group, that carrier could instantly appear
significantly less safe than is justified by a single
violation.
Profiling
As Commenters have shown in past proceedings,
anomalous reporting results from the assignment of
inspection values to carriers; the availability of weigh
station bypass systems like PrePass; and a failure to
report clean inspections uniformly throughout all
states.
As members of the MCRR Coalition noted in
response to FMCSA’s SFD Proposal, the Agency’s
use of inspection profiling and the Inspection
Selection System (“ISS”) program are inherently
biased against small carriers. An unwarranted
“negative feedback loop” is created when the
system relies primarily on past inspections to target
current inspections. Inspection profiling undoubtedly
explains why small carriers receive far more scrutiny
than their larger brethren. Power units operated by
motor carriers with 1 to 4 trucks are inspected
nearly three times as often as those operated by
carriers with 1,000 or more trucks.6
At the outset, Commenters take issue with the
statement of Joseph DeLorenzo, director of the
FMCSA Office of Enforcement and Compliance, at
the September 8 public meeting in this docket
regarding clean inspections. While DeLorenzo’s
comment that 40% of reported inspections do not
involve a violation is factually correct, it is misleading
because once again there is a wide disparity among
states. California, which reports more inspections
than any other state, had a clean inspection rate in
2016 of 56.2%, behind only Mississippi, Montana,
West Virginia, and Alaska. On the other hand,
Texas, which reports the second-largest number of
inspections, had a clean inspection rate near the
bottom at 26.1%. Ten states had clean inspection
rates below 25%.
Moreover, the above figures are based on situations
when an inspection is actually reported. Another
major concern is situations when inspectors choose
not to report inspections at all because no violation
was unearthed in a walk-around. Analyzing this
problem obviously is thorny because it involves
quantifying the extent of non-existent data.
However, there is data beyond extensive anecdotal
reports of missing clean inspections. For example, in
a survey conducted in 2016 by Overdrive and
research firm TransAdvise, 48% of carriers
reported that clean inspections are not consistently
recorded in their experience.7
Enforcement Biases
Analysts and regulators tend to ignore the fact that
the data feeding their models and databases
originate with state agencies and individual
inspectors. Commenters have already referred to
this phenomenon in the discussion of inconsistent
enforcement. For example, Midwestern states such
as Indiana and Michigan have focused much of their
enforcement efforts in the Unsafe Driving BASIC,
while Texas and California have placed relatively
more emphasis on the Vehicle Maintenance and
Driver Fitness BASICs. Once again, the NAS
Report (at p. 51) seems to shrug off state-by-state
enforcement differences as being “not something
that FMCSA can unilaterally change.”
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Another bias lies in the types of violations that
inspectors report within individual BASICs. It is
much easier to catch a driver on a reporting
oversight than it is to painstakingly compare
supporting documents to log grids in order to prove
a false log. And it is easier to cite a vehicle for an
inoperative lamp than it is to crawl under the chassis
to inspect brakes caked with dirt and grease.
The effectiveness of the two most important
BASICs in terms of carriers covered – Vehicle
Maintenance and HOS Compliance – is undermined
by a dominance of minor violations. For example,
about half of the HOS Compliance violations are
form and manner infractions. The Vehicle
Maintenance BASIC is heavily skewed toward
violations, such as inoperative marker lights, that
standing alone are insufficient to signify that
equipment is unfit to operate. Also, profiling of units
for vehicle maintenance inspections is particularly
high and prejudicial to intermodal carriers, to
owner-operators that operate older equipment, and
to oilfield carriers that frequently operate off-road.
If the proposed IRT model does not completely
resolve the state-by-state inspection and violation
distribution discrepancies, or if individual states are
not forced into uniformity in inspection and data-
collection methods, the same systemic flaws will
continue to plague the new model. But even if those
systemic flaws somehow could be resolved, no
statistical model can veto or repeal the law of small
numbers. The NAS Report essentially advocates an
enormous investment of time and money to create a
highly opaque set of algorithms that – because of
these systemic flaws – at best would be only
marginally more effective than SMS.
(Footnotes)
1 Members of this coalition have explored SMS
flaws exhaustively in multiple proceedings, most
recently in the docket concerning the now-
withdrawn SFD Proposal. See
https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=FMCSA-2015-0001-0184
. See also
https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=FMCSA-2012-0074-0070
.
2 Although percentiles and alerts currently are
withheld for property carriers, FMCSA now
publishes absolute measures on these carriers,
which are not subject to any data sufficiency
thresholds. These measures are subject to
misinterpretation and are potentially even more
damaging than the relative metrics published
previously.
3 For example, see
The Relative Contribution of Truck Drivers and
Passenger Car Drivers to Two-Vehicle, Truck-
Car Traffic Crashes
, D.F. Blower, Publication No. UMTRI-98-25,
UMTRI, 1998.
4 For example, see the Large Truck and Bus Crash
Facts 2015 at
https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov/files/
docs/safety/data-and-statistics/Large-Truck-and-
Bus-Crash-Facts-2015.pdf , p. 77.
5 A substantial number of moving violations likely go
unreported to FMCSA’s Motor Carrier
Management Information System because of a
change in SAFETEA-LU that allowed states to
receive grant funds for issuing moving violation
citations on motor carriers without reporting an
associated inspection. Many consider this to be the
principal reason for the huge drop in traffic
enforcement inspections since the mid-2000s.
6 See the Vise affidavit in the Coalition comments on
the SFD Proposal:
https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=FMCSA-2015-0001-0184
7 See
id.
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ABSTRACT
While aerial delivery drones capture headlines, the pace of adoption of drones in warehouses has shown the
greatest acceleration. Warehousing constitutes 30% of the cost of logistics in the US. The rise of e-
commerce, greater customer service demands of retail stores, and a shortage of skilled labor have
intensified competition for efficient warehouse operations. This takes place during an era of shortening
technology life cycles. This paper integrates several theoretical perspectives on technology diffusion and
adoption to propose a framework to inform supply chain decision-makers on when to invest in new robotics
technology.
INTRODUCTION
Unmanned drones have been described as “on the
verge of blowing a big hole in the supply-chain”
(Bamburry, 2015) - an assertion supported by a
predicted global market of $22.15 billion by 2022
representing a compounded annual growth rate
(CAGR) of 20.7% from 2015 to 2022 (Stratistics,
2016). The military and consumer markets drove
much early growth, and recent commercial usage
has ballooned from 102,600 units in 2016 to a
projected 805,000 units in 2021, representing a
five-year CAGR of 51% (Meola, 2017).
Defined as “robot vehicles” that are remotely or
unmanned piloted, tethered, or autonomous (Rys,
2016), aerial unmanned drones captured headlines
after Amazon made the first unmanned aerial vehicle
delivery to a customer in England on December 7,
2016 (Bort, 2017). Regulatory challenges have
slowed unmanned aerial drone use in open skies for
delivery by companies including Amazon and
Domino’s Pizza. At the same time the pace of
adoption in warehouse drones has accelerated,
conducting infrastructure monitoring and inventory
management using bar codes, QR codes, and RFID
in combination with industrial Internet of Things
technologies, and wheeled unmanned drones
working both autonomously and in tandem with
humans to pick-and-pull (Appelbaum and Nehmer,
2017). Preliminary results suggest paradigm-shifting
improvements for inventory management, with Wal-
Mart reporting that unmanned warehouse drones
cut the warehouse inventory count process from 30
days using manual processes to one day (Bose,
2017), and Amazon’s 2012 acquisition of robotics
powerhouse Kiva for $775 million is cited as the
cornerstone to its ability to provide even more
efficient and effective next-day and two-day
shipping (Kim, 2016; Nichols, 2016).
The process of adoption of technology has resulted
in a media cycle of exaggerating the promise of a
new technology in the short-run while
underestimating its importance over the long run—
dubbed the “hype cycle” by Gartner and more
generally known as Amara’s law (PC Magazine,
n.d.)—renders suspect most of the prognostications
in mainstream media. Given the importance of
warehousing in global supply chains (Frazelle,
2002a) and that warehousing constitutes 30% of the
cost of logistics in the US (AT Kearney, 2016), the
time is right for a reasoned inquiry regarding the
factors that supply chain decision-makers should
use to decide when to invest in the new robotics
technology.
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This paper compares models of technology diffusion
in order to develop a hybrid model that combines
the insights of several empirically supported
perspectives. Warehouse operations are reviewed
for the purpose of applying this knowledge to the
domain of warehouse drone robots. Next, the
thoughts of several supply chain professionals are
presented based upon exploratory conversations,
followed by a brief conclusion regarding the
applicability of technology diffusion models and the
hype versus reality of warehouse drone robots in the
near future.
Drone Technology
The term “drone” may include a number of different
characteristics. In general, “drone technology”
involves using unmanned robotic vehicles. There is a
tendency to immediately conclude drone technology
only involves the multi-rotor or quadcopter aerial
devices touted by firms such as Amazon (unmanned
aerial vehicles or UAV); however, drone technology
may also involve (Drone, n.d.):
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) including
multirotor or quadcopter which is a type of
unmanned aerial vehicle
unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV)
unmanned spacecraft both remote
controlled (“unmanned space mission”) and
autonomous (“robotic spacecraft” or “space
probes”)
Unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) such as
autonomous self-driving automobiles
Unmanned surface vehicle (USV) for
operation on the surface of water
Autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) or
unmanned undersea vehicles (UUV) for
operation underwater
For this paper, we investigated wheeled unmanned
ground vehicles (UGV) utilized for warehouse
operations and specify them as “warehouse
drones”. These include driverless trucks, aerial
delivery drones, wheeled, warehouse drones, and
warehouse robots.
Technology Diffusion Model
There are several models of technology diffusion,
for example, “product life cycle management
(PLC)” dominates in marketing, the technology
acceptance model (TAM) developed in information
technology research, and the spiral life cycle (SLC)
model developed to manage risks in software
development. Since unmanned warehouse drones
represent a unique combination of mainstream
product, information technology systems, and
software, each model is compared, with insights
distilled into a new “spiral cost implementation model.”
Product Life Cycle Model
The product life cycle management model was
originally developed by Everett Rogers (1962), a
communications professor who defined diffusion as
the process by which an innovation is communicated
over time among the members of a social system
through certain channels, with system saturation
modeled using a logistic curve (Figure 1). Theodore
Levitt (1965) brought the PLC into the mainstream
for general business use by matching each stage of
diffusion with marketing and product management
advice. Subsequently, Frank Bass (1969) published
the most widely used forecasting model that
describes the PLC mathematically based upon the
coefficients of innovation and imitation.
Based upon the rapid growth in market demand of
20-50% (Stratistics, 2016; Meola, 2017),
unmanned warehouse drone demand demonstrates
the inflection point that transitions from the
“introduction” to the “growth” stage of the PLC.
The PLC provides some basis for distinguishing
customer segments based on their adoption
process—they either adopt based on written
communications such as technical reports, or they
await word of mouth regarding the product or
technology’s promise. Disadvantages of the PLC
are its simplification and aggregation of the complex
processes of innovation, diffusion, and adoption—
the PLC looks strictly at the aggregate adoption
behavior for a new product or technology, and does
not incorporate considerations such as technical
capabilities, costs, or risks. The next model, the
Technology Acceptance Model, incorporates some
of these factors.
Technology Acceptance Model
The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) was
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originally developed by Fred Davis (1989) as an
extension of the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein
and Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980).
TAM’s advantage to managers considering adopting
warehouse drone technology is that it is the most
empirically applied and validated model of users’
acceptance and usage of technology (Venkatesh and
Davis, 2000; Maranguniæ and Graniæ, 2015),
incorporating the external variables of perceived
usefulness and ease of use to explain the adoption
process. These variables provide insights into the
drivers for humans to adopt a new technology or
product, with greater levels of perceived usefulness
and ease of use predicting a greater probability of
technology acceptance.
TAM offers the advantage of using easily
measurable characteristics to predict the likelihood
of adoption at the level of the individual user. The
model’s measurement instruments have been widely
validated (e.g., Adams, et al., 1992) and extended
to include additional social and cognitive factors
(Venkatesh and Davis, 2000). TAM’s
disadvantages include failure to consider cost and
structural factors that obligate or prevent technology
adoption (Lunceford, 2009), and the potential lack
of meaning for an individual technology user trying
to assess “perceived usefulness” due to its broad
and dynamic nature. These disadvantages both
diminish the applicability of TAM in the warehouse
environment which is cost-sensitive, demonstrate
fixed structural factors (at least in the short run), and
the issue of deciphering usefulness of a new
technology that may require several iterations to
optimize. Both of these disadvantages may be
addressed using the spiral life cycle model proposed
next.
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Spiral Life Cycle Model
Supply chain managers considering drone adoption
often consider the risk and cost involved. Barry
Boehm (1986, 1988) originally developed the spiral
life cycle model for defense software development
in order to shift project decisions from a coding or
document-driven process to a risk-driven approach.
In the words of Boehm (2000), the spiral model is a
“process model generator” because its output
prescribes the appropriate process for managing a
project based upon a four-step iterative process
that incorporates risk assessment and cost (see
Figure 3).
The spiral life cycle model starts in the middle of the
diagram with the four basic activities performed
during every cycle: determining objectives
(planning), followed by identifying and resolving
risks (risk analysis), development and testing
(engineering), and planning the next iteration
(evaluation). At the very beginning of the model, the
concept of operations, the concept of requirement,
and the operations plan are developed. Cost
accumulates as iterations or prototypes are
produced, and the spiral model advises how to
minimize the level of risk by scaling the level of effort
and degree of details. The spiral life cycle model
incorporates other extant process models such as
incremental, waterfall, and prototyping as special
cases depending on the risk patterns of certain
projects (Boehm, 2000).
The spiral life cycle model offers advantages for
minimizing risk, especially for large projects, and for
managing and controlling documentation and
approval processes; these features make the model
conducive to development of new product lines
rather than implementation of a new supply chain
operational technology. The model may be costly to
implement and not very suitable for small projects,
such as implementing drones in a single warehouse.
Additionally, while the spiral life cycle determines a
project process and incorporates cost, it depends
heavily upon identifying risks, which may vary
widely depending upon the project. A framework
that specifically incorporates supply chain and
unmanned warehouse drone risk factors would
prove advantageous for managers and researchers
assessing incorporation of unmanned warehouse
drone, robots, and related digital economy
advances.
Spiral Cost Implementation Model (SCIM)
The spiral cost implementation model (SCIM)
represents a hybrid framework that combines the
previous models in order to encompass their salient
positive aspects while compensating for reduced
parsimony by reducing the negative aspects. The
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framework modifies the spiral life cycle model by
focusing on costs at every stage and repeating the
evaluation stages. The model assumes adoption of
an existing technology available on the market,
which is an important difference from the spiral life
cycle model that focuses on innovating a new
product or technology, and renders the model
particularly appropriate for the warehouse drone
adoption decision.
The SCIM framework incorporates a constant
review phase in response to the intensely dynamic
technology and regulatory environments. A cost
review at every stage of the model reflects the rapid
changes and the shift of purpose from developing
new product lines to on-going supply chain
operations. As a visual enhancement, the spiral
grows larger or smaller based on the cost in each
phase. SCIM incorporates the TAM’s perceived
usefulness into the planning and evaluation stages.
The model loses in its application to creating a new
technology, but gains from greater depth of analysis
when adopting a new offering available on the open
market—a circumstance currently confronted by
warehouse managers considering drone adoption.
THE WAREHOUSING ENVIRONMENT
Warehousing represents close to 30% of US supply
chain costs (AT Kearney, 2016), with 55% or more
resulting from order picking costs which would
respond readily to automation (van den Berg and
Zijm, 1999; De Koster, et al., 2007). [Warehouse]
drone implementation should address current
inefficiencies in warehousing most amenable to
automation including inventory accuracy, inventory
locating, space utilization, redundant processes, and
picking optimization (Garcia, 2013; van den Berg
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and Zijm, 1999). The key drivers for modern
warehouse management is the reduction of inventory
due to heightened financial risks, shorter response
times, and increased productivity (van den Berg and
Zijm, 1999).
Warehousing increasingly relies upon “smart”
technologies that incorporate information tracking
technologies such as bar coding, electronic data
interchange (EDI), and radio frequency identification
(RFID) into data processing systems designed to
aid decision-making (Autry, et al., 2005)—
unmanned warehouse drones represent the logical
extension that integrates the virtual information
processes with the physical warehouse processes.
The rate of growth of industrial robots provides
evidence of this integration. Overall world supply of
industrial robots hit an annual record increase for the
fourth year in a row in 2016, and increased 84%
from 2011 to 2016 compared to the 2005 to 2008
timeframe (IFR World Robotics, 2017). The world
population of industrial robots is projected to
increase from 1.8 million in 2016 to over 3 million
by 2020. Industry reports predict warehouse
robotics compound annual growth rate varies from
7.6% through 2024 (Goldstein Research, 2017) up
to 11.5% through 2021 (Mordor Intelligence, 2017)
and 11.6% through 2023 (Dasyam, 2017).
Warehouse robotics has gone from novelty to
mainstream for larger companies seeking
competitive advantage in an era of labor shortages
and highly demanding customers (Futch, 2017).
Practical considerations mean that warehousing
offers a particularly compelling application for
unmanned warehouse drones compared to oft-
hyped direct-to-customer delivery drones. The co-
founder of Kiva—the warehouse drone company
acquired by Amazon in 2012—identified three
major challenges that will delay use of unmanned
warehouse drones for direct-to-customer delivery
that will take several technology iterations to
overcome: vehicle design, localization and
navigation, and vehicle coordination (D’Andrea,
2014). Once the technological challenges are
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overcome, issues such as public reactions, privacy
concerns, and government regulation will offer
further challenges. Warehouses provide protected
and controlled environments that obviate these
concerns, and the future of direct-to-customer
delivery drones may be extensions of warehouse
drones. The SCIM model implies that as market
offerings of drone technology continue to evolve,
they should diminish the risk of direct-to-customer
deliveries while simultaneously reducing the cost per
delivery until such a point that the cost and risk
become acceptable.
Unmanned warehouse drones may greatly improve
warehouse operations. As previously noted,
warehouse drones may be aerial or wheeled. For
difficult to reach places unmanned aerial warehouse
drones facilitate inventory management using bar
codes, QR codes, and RFID in combination with
industrial focused Internet of Things technologies,
and wheeled unmanned warehouse drones work
both autonomously and in tandem with humans to
pick-and-pull, with Wal-Mart reporting that the
switch from manual to warehouse drone-based
processes cut warehouse inventory time from 30
days to one day (Bose, 2017). Warehouse
operators have relatively low profit margins (3-6%),
which impedes their ability to invest in technological
capital, a fact which accentuates competitive
advantage for those who do (AT Kearney, 2016).
Unmanned aerial warehouse drones perform tasks
other than moving product. The cost of inventory
auditing with aerial warehouse drones is
approximately half the annual cost of a live
employee and eliminates most of the need for
humans to climb warehouse racks and perform
other dangerous work (Appelbaum and Nehmer,
2017; PwC, 2016). Amazon has already reduced
“click to ship” time from 60-75 minutes with a
human to 15 minutes with warehouse drones;
additionally, Amazon’s drone enabled warehouses
carry 50% more inventory per square foot and have
20% lower operating costs, a savings of $22 million
per warehouse for 13 warehouses so far
(Bhattacharya, 2016). Other companies report
costs as low as 10 cents per order for automated
picking versus 80 cents for the typical order pick
(Banker, 2017). Incorporating low-light, infrared,
and other capabilities these unmanned warehouse
drones may often observe more with high resolution
video or still cameras, useful for temperature
controlled items, monitoring vermin, seeing items in
dark corners, and identifying signs of leaking roofs
or faulty wiring. Unmanned aerial warehouse drones
may also provide auditability details such as geo-
locational, RFID, and other sensor data. Unmanned
aerial warehouse drones may reinforce the
auditability of other inputs, such as verifying that
RFID tags are attached to the correct product;
overlapping of technologies may provide hitherto
unachievable inventory accuracy on an hour-by-
hour basis.
Warehouse drones hold the promise of taking
inventory and facility management to greater heights
of efficiency and effectiveness. As one example, in
collaboration with two important research sponsors,
MIT believes that warehouse drone technology
could have saved $3 billion in lost revenue for
Walmart, and prevented the US Army from losing
track of $5.8 billion in assets (Hardesty, 2017).
Determining where warehouse drones may best
contribute requires first enumerating the types,
activities, and functionalities of warehouses.
Types, Activities, and Functionalities of
Warehouses
Warehouses fall into three categories (van den Berg
and Zijm, 1999). A distribution warehouse collects
and sometimes assembles products from different
suppliers for subsequent customer delivery. A
production warehouse localizes in a production
facility and stores raw materials, semi-finished
products, and finished products in a production
facility. A contract warehouse discharges the
warehousing operation on behalf of one or more
customers.
All types of warehouses conduct four primary
functional activities (Coyle, et al., 2017):
Accumulation: receipt of goods from a
variety of locations
Sortation: assembling like products for
storage or transfer to customers
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Allocation: matching available inventory to
customer orders (break-bulk)
Assortment: product mixing capability
Picking constitutes in excess of 60% of warehousing
costs and represents the greatest opportunity for
unmanned warehouse drones to generate
efficiencies (van den Berg and Zijm, 1999; De
Koster, et al., 2007).
Locus Robotics is an example of how a modern
unmanned warehouse drone can work side-by-side
with humans, doing most of the 12-16 miles per day
that warehouse workers walk but still requiring
humans to pick and place products on the robot’s
tray (Garfield, 2016). Locus Robotics forecasts up
to 800% productivity improvements since the
robots move faster than humans, can work 24 hours
straight, and take no breaks; freeing humans to
provide a personal touch to the shipments that are
craved by consumers of e-commerce parcel goods,
such as personalized notes or fancy wrapping paper.
Optimizing Warehouse Flows for Unmanned
Drones
Warehouse layouts generally fall into two styles
(Figure 5), the U-flow and the through-flow
(Frazelle, 2002b). The U-flow design locates fast
moving products on the inner side of a U-shaped
flow so that product moves less distance at all
stages of warehouse operations. This improves use
of dock resources since inbound and outbound
occur on the same or proximate docks, improves
efficient lift truck utilization since fast-moving
product is located close to the docks, and improves
security since entry and exit occupy the same side of
the building.
Through-flow warehouses move all product in a
straight line from one side of the building to the
opposite, locating fast-moving items along the center
aisle of the warehouse and slower items along the
walls of the warehouse (Frazelle, 2002b). This
layout requires all product to move the length of the
building and is less flexible. It provides advantages
for avoiding confusion regarding product flowing in
and out, and when different material handling
equipment is used for in-flows vs. out-flows.
Factory warehouses often use the flow-through
layout.
The interest in warehouse drones by companies like
Wal-Mart and Amazon focuses on leveraging drone
strengths primarily to maintain inventory accuracy
and to shorten response times for picking in
response to consumer orders—an environment
conducive to U-flow warehouse layouts. In addition
to greater speed of picking, warehouse drones
reduce losses to shrinkage—especially relevant for
high value finished goods—and the U-flow layout
results in shorter trips to recharging stations, a
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critical consideration with current battery technology
(D’Andrea, 2014). Other factors that suggest that
consumer finished goods warehouse drones will
initially establish themselves in U-flow warehouses
are based on the assumption that U-flow
warehouses are more likely to be the design of
choice for finished consumer goods, the potential to
standardize packaging for consumer goods,
improved product identification (barcodes, RFID),
and the greater value (and profitability) of finished
goods to pay for the early investments in technology.
Through-flow warehouses are often attached to
production facilities, and the product more often
changes shape and form, which presents a challenge
for warehouse drone technology for the near future.
Cross-dock facilities represent the application of the
through-flow layout to finished goods—the bulk
nature of the entering goods diminishes the
productivity advantage for warehouse drones vs.
human labor. Other challenges to the current state of
warehouse drone technology include the ability to
move increased product weight and travel further,
factors which increase time spent at charging
stations. Warehouse drone technology exists with
the potential to facilitate through-flow work such as
the Automated Ground Vehicles described in the
next section, yet it does not demonstrate the rapid
growth of smaller, lighter warehouse drones, and
additionally appears in U-flow warehouses.
Best Approach for Warehousing with
Unmanned Warehouse Drones
Warehousing is a labor-intensive industry, and has
become even more so with the strong growth of e-
commerce which requires picking more “eaches”, or
single units of product, in response to consumer
order size. This trend has driven part of the 53%
increase of warehouse employment from 622,000 in
January 2017 to 950,000 in July 20171, and has
increased wages for warehouse workers 6% in the
past year (Smith, 2017) E-commerce warehouses
tend to locate near population centers, and offer a
better value proposition than retail, an even more
labor-intensive industry (Gebeloff and Russell,
2017), even when e-commerce related warehouse
jobs command a 26% premium over traditional
retail jobs (Mandel, 2017).
Warehouses have also increasingly adopted
automation, with one consultant citing an increase
from eight in ten clients having some level of
warehouse automation (Smith, 2017). The primary
automation designed to expedite high volumes of
small, multi-line orders (Banker, 2017) are
automated guided vehicles (AGV’s)that perform
goods-to-person (also known as goods-to-picker).
In this role, AGV’s include robot auxiliaries that take
over material transport from human pickers. Large
AGV’s can move bulk and palletized goods—such
as forklifts that work either autonomously or in
conjunction with a human—but most act as shuttles
between human pickers and packing lines; the latter
type of warehouse drone shows particular promise
since it does not require modifications to warehouse
layouts, comes with essentially turnkey installation,
and all types of AGV’s save human repetitive labor
and movement (Appelbaum and Nehmer, 2017),
thus increasing performance and safety
simultaneously. As previously noted, AGV’s
improve efficiencies primarily at retrieving from
storage and as an expeditor for human labor, and
increasingly share data amongst themselves and with
other IT systems such as warehouse management
systems, with pick costs going from 80 cents to 10
cents per pick after automation (Banker, 2017) and
order pick times going from 60-75 minutes to 15
minutes (Bhattacharya, 2016).
Goods-to-picker, also known as goods-to-person,
automate warehouses by bringing goods to humans
to pick. Kiva is the goods-to-picker warehouse
drone used by Amazon that resembles an automated
warehouse drone vacuum (e.g., a Roomba) that
goes beneath a set of shelves, lifts it, and brings it to
the human picker. Industry leaders indicate expect
to adopt commercially viable unmanned warehouse
drones in about a year (Baskin, 2017).
The current generation of unmanned warehouse
drones performs material transport, acting as a
shuttle between humans who pick and pack the
goods. The greatest impact of implementing
warehouse robotics remains the ability to perform
the human tasks of identifying product on the shelf,
picking product in non-standardized packaging, and
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understanding the human context of the goods in
order to properly package it for presentation to a
human customer. Amazon launched a $250,000
competition, now in its third year to develop a robot
that can perform the human portion of order picking
reliably; commercial application could occur as soon
as next year (Baskin, 2017), albeit the competition
focuses on stationary robots and does not require
unmanned warehouse drones.
Primary uses for unmanned warehouse drones
include inventory audit, infrastructure and security
surveillance. Warehousing competitive advantage
relies strongly upon data integration in real time, a
capability that unmanned warehouse drone use
reinforces (Gresham, 2017; Waller and Fawcett,
2013), yet picking represents the greatest need for
labor savings. Commercially available unmanned
warehouse drones may lift up to 10 kilograms (22
lbs.). (Dronelli, 2017), perfect for e-commerce, and
the incentive for labor savings which should drive
robotic picking technology to unmanned warehouse
drones. Unmanned warehouse drones promise
productivity improvements, do not require breaks,
improve accuracy, maximize use of 3D space
utilization, and alleviate injury, repetitive task, and
other worker quality of life issues related to what the
warehousing industry calls the 3D’s category: dirty,
dangerous, and difficult (Fiveash, 2016).
Exploratory research suggest that executives may be
unaware of the impact of unmanned warehouse
drone technology even over the next few years as
discussed in the next section.
Motives for Intransigence
Despite the advantages of warehouse drones and
robotics, certain issues create intransigence when it
comes to adopting the new technology. Positive
leadership support represents the single most
important factor for bringing a knowledge or data-
related initiative successfully to fruition (Patil and
Kant, 2014). While 75% of executives assert the
importance of digital transformation across the
supply chain, 48% still use non-digital (phone, fax,
email) communications; only 15% can access the
majority of needed data from trading partners, and
23% have the ability to analyze the data to make
better supply chain decisions (Dougados and
Felgendreher, 2016). When the same group of 337
executives from across multiple industries were
asked to forecast five years into the future, 68%
expected that data from across the majority of
trading partners in the supply chain will be available
to be analyzed and 54% expect to have access to
the majority of needed data from their trading
partners—indicating that technology is expected to
advance rapidly throughout supply chains.
While supply chain executives exhibit knowledge
and optimism about information supply chains, the
literature suggests that they have relatively little
knowledge or optimism about the physical supply
chain. The traditional view of the supply chain looks
at the information, financials, and product moving in
essentially a straight line; but increasingly, supply
chains may be divided into support supply chains—
those nodes through which the physical product
does not flow but which support the physical
movement—and the physical supply chain, which
encompasses the traditional view of the product
accompanied by its information and financials
(Carter, et al., 2015).
EXECUTIVE’S STATE OF AWARENESS ON
DRONE TECHNOLOGY
In order to confirm the state of awareness of
unmanned warehouse drone technology, we present
the results of conversations with three executives
from three industries about their knowledge of
current unmanned warehouse drone use and their
thoughts regarding the future of unmanned
warehouse drone use. While the executives appear
optimistic about the support supply chain that falls
largely outside of their direct control, the
conversations suggest that executives are much less
informed and optimistic about the future technology
that impacts the physical supply chain more directly
under their control. Given the importance of supply
chain velocity and order accuracy—physical and
informational—to supply chain integration and
competitive advantage (Handfield and Linton, 2017;
Hofman, 2004), as well as the quick resolution and
mitigation of supply chain disruptions (Craighead, et
al., 2007), more work should address the
information gap among decision-makers regarding
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digital technologies such as unmanned warehouse
drones and 3D printing that will have an impact on
the physical supply chains of the future. The results
from our conversations suggest that supply chain
decision-makers appreciate the potential of
information technology yet remain staunchly
traditional in their views of the physical aspects of
supply chain technology. Questions and responses
appear in the appendix.
Regional Wholesale Club
The vice president of transportation for a regional
wholesale club with operations in 15 states is
responsible for improving operational efficiencies by
automating transportation tasks and optimizing the
planning of shipments. The transportation function
efficiency depends upon accurate inventory
information and tracking movement of goods at
distribution centers throughout the shipping process.
This executive expressed an appreciation for the
ability of unmanned warehouse drones to conduct
inventory audits, monitor for security breaches, and
trailer pool validation in the distribution center
environment.
With regard to the company’s greatest warehouse
operational bottlenecks, he cited four areas. First,
the “put to club” case or tier breakdown consumes
much more time than the full pallet cross-dock
process. Second, peak volume times see congestion
in the building and yard. Third, certain specialized
processes require holding inventory at the
distribution center rather than sending immediately
to the store, which slows velocity. One example is
holding candy during the warm months to be
processed one day per week in temperature-
controlled trailers. Fourth, sorting through non-
merchandise returns such as empty pallets, dunnage,
plastic, and water jugs is slow and cumbersome.
The wholesale club enjoys several advantages. One
is strong internal inventory controls resulting in
inventory shrinkage that is well below the industry
average. Another is vendor-owned inventory for
most cold goods until they reach the stores. The
company has achieved very low inventory in storage
at only $50 million out of $1 billion of goods moving
through its supply chain (5% of total value of goods
moved). Company financials reveal the benefits of
this performance: inventory turns were 10.6 and
receivables turnover was 81.1, more than double
and quadruple, respectively, for the retail industry
overall (CSI Market, 2017). Such a lean supply
chain could be improved even further through
unmanned warehouse drones in conjunction with
RFID tracking in order to monitor the cargo yard in
real time. This could improve visibility and real-time
decision-making greatly over the current system of
periodically walking the yard and make the
company’s lean supply chain more resilient against
disruptions. Improved cost accountability could be
an additional benefit since allocating costs of current
activities such as the yard walks proves complex; a
drone would provide detailed records of its
observations, associated inventories and assets, and
time spent.
National 3PL
A national account manager at a national 3PL made
the connection between unmanned warehouse
drones and tracking trailers, yet prefers GPS
tracking as a solution. The 3PL is primarily a
transportation company focused on trucking that
also provides warehousing, logistics, and intermodal
services. The company assets include nearly 5,000
trailers and 2,000 power units with low dwell times,
which explains the manager’s preference for GPS
tracking. The company owns multiple facilities near
the ports of Baltimore and Norfolk and leases
public warehouse space. With many mobile assets
and few fixed facilities, this 3PL could benefit less
from unmanned warehouse drones, although
unmanned warehouse drones could provide trailer
tracking and security of the existing facilities and
yards where the company drops its trailers.
National Supplier of Electronic
Hardware Components
The third conversation was with the warehouse
manager at a leading national supplier of electronic
hardware components. Much of their product fits in
either a large box size of 8.5 x 8 x 3.5 inches (21.5
x 20.3 x 8.9 cm) or a small box size of 6.5 x 4 x 3.5
inches (16.5 x10.2 x 8.9 cm). Average pick time by
humans is 1 minute 5 seconds, due to small product
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size, multiple SKU’s, and a bar coding system that
suffers occasional signal interruptions common to
Wi-Fi technology and the slowdowns common to
trying to scan barcodes in general,. The package
size and light weight of the company’s products
seem ideal for future unmanned warehouse drones,
especially in combination with an upgrade from
barcode technology to a more reliable and
sophisticated technology such as RFID. The
manager demonstrated insightful understanding of
unmanned warehouse drone technology with the
observation that they would provide a greater pay-
off if the warehouse’s ceilings were higher.
Interviews Summary
Overall, these conversations suggest that supply
chain managers may not understand the potential for
operational improvements offered by the current
generation of unmanned warehouse drones. A
limited understanding of the current benefits and
potential of unmanned warehouse drones
underscores an even more limited understanding of
the future of unmanned warehouse drone
technology.
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
Warehouse drones represent a fundamental shift in
supply chain management in several ways.
Operationally, warehouse drones improve
warehouse functionality by better utilizing available
space, reducing production downtime, reducing
labor turnover and downtime, improving health and
safety, increasing warehouse flexibility, and
increasing productivity output. These benefits argue
in favor of adoption of warehouse drone technology
especially as costs continue to diminish as the
industry matures.
Substantial research has assessed technology
adoption and the rate of technological diffusion, and
this research suggests combining extant models to
provide more comprehensive guidance for decision-
makers to assess cost and timing of technology
adoption in order to determine investments in
warehouse drone technology. Limited research
assesses the specific impacts of robots on economic
and productivity outcomes (Muro and Andes,
2015), especially in the supply chain context,
making further research in this area vital.
This paper offers several important questions that
should be addressed in future research:
1) Future research should confirm early
findings that robots have contributed to
productivity gains on the scale of the steam
engine’s effect on late 19th century
productivity, the archetypical general
purpose technology (Graetz and Michaels,
2015).
2) Assuming these findings regarding general
robotics productivity gains find confirmation
in subsequent research, they suggest that
work needs to be done to explore the
perceptions of executives regarding the
advantages and disadvantages specific to
the context of warehouse drones.
3) Relatedly, future research should measure
the financial impact and cost trade-offs of
drone technology in the warehouse setting.
Financially, drones shift from human labor
that constitutes variable costs to fixed
investments in capital. Higher fixed costs
create an impetus to maximize productivity
so as to spread the cost of capital over
more units—making warehouse drones apt
for the high volume, high-throughput e-
commerce distribution center environment.
4) With talent shortages predicted of at least 6
openings to each available laborer
(Ruamsook and Craighead, 2014), many
distribution center and warehouse managers
confronting the supply chain talent shortage
may see the opportunity for relief by
replacing human workers with drone
automation. In this scenario, automation
may have two effects, firstly alleviating the
challenge of filling technically qualified
positions, and secondly freeing up resources
so that companies can better afford to train
workers for the work that automation
cannot perform. Assuming that countries
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where more automation prevails actually
generate more jobs or at least lose less jobs
(Graetz and Michaels, 2015), automation
seems unlikely to solve the talent shortage,
yet may become the price of entry into an
industry competing for efficiencies and
workers. More research needs to address
the important role of warehouse drones in
particular and automation in general in
relation to the issue of employment and
human resource management.
5) Future research should be conducted and
oriented toward understanding the
circumstances under which drones and
automation could replace or complement
human labor.  This requires more complete
enumeration of the functional roles and
physical capabilities of drones. The current
state of drone applications focuses on
surveillance, inventory management, and
picking, with picking reliant on humans to
pick up-and-place the inventory while the
warehouse drones and robots perform
shuttle duties. As noted previously, experts
project that in the near future robots will be
able to pick most forms of products and
seem likely to be able to master the
challenging task of identifying and retrieving
a single item from a jumbled box (Baskin,
2017). Warehouse automation technology
can currently handle approximately 75% of
products. Some warehouse tasks continue
to pose additional challenges, especially
assembly tasks, delicate small items such as
produce, and packaging in plastic or
partially obscured products, such as
garment-on-hangar (Ackerman, 2016). A
comprehensive typology of applications
would facilitate the advancement of both
drone technology and managerial decision-
making regarding adopting new automation
technology.
6) Strategic managerial and organizational
factors related to the rate of adoption of
warehouse drone technology, and the
timeline for implementing new technologies
in supply chain settings should be defined.
An indicator of the potential for
improvements appears in the Capgemini
(2016) report which found that almost half
of managers (48%) communicate with
supply chain partners primarily through
“traditional” technologies like phone, fax
and emails rather than internet or cloud-
based technologies—the same survey-
based work revealed that two-thirds of the
same executives expected adoption of
major new technologies to integrate their
supply chains in the next five years.
Managers will need clearer guidance for this
new technology and others to follow.
Adoption and application of warehouse
drones present many additional
opportunities for future research.
CONCLUSION
Current unmanned warehouse drone technology
offers the potential for significant efficiency gains
both for inventory handling and inventory
transparency. Unmanned warehouse drones offer
strong potential with inventory audits and real-time
supply chain visibility. Warehouse drone technology
supports supply chain competitive advantage vis-à-
vis supply chain integration and shortened cycle
times to support improved customer service levels
and supply chain responsiveness. Based upon
recent developments in the Amazon warehouse
robot competition, the application of unmanned
warehouse drones to reduce the greatest warehouse
cost—picking—appears to be on the verge of rapid
adoption. The Amazon warehouse competition may
have generated innovation of robot pickers to
commercial application in four years, and it seems
reasonable to expect a similar timespan for the
technology to incorporate unmanned warehouse
drones. As early adopters companies that invest in
unmanned warehouse drones will garner operational
benefits sooner and be better positioned for the next
generation of unmanned warehouse drones.
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ABSTRACT
Containerization has had an outsized impact on the growth of global trade over the past 60 years. The Great
Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway is an important bi-national waterway. Since the advent of containerization in
the 1950’s there has been much excitement about the prospects of scheduled container shipping in the Great
Lakes. There is a perception that direct container service will add value to the economy of the Great Lakes-
St. Lawrence Basin (GLSLB). However, due to unique shipping constraints in the Great Lakes-St.
Lawrence Seaway, significant container service has not materialized. This research seeks to explain the
current state of container shipping in the Great Lakes, as well as provide an analysis of the feasibility of
future container shipping in the Great Lakes.  It is very important for policymakers to understand both the
opportunities for container shipping, and the barriers and issues with such services.  A lack of understanding
of these points can lead to missed opportunities and/or the potential for significant expenditures of time and
money on unrealistic projects.
INTRODUCTION
Container shipping has become synonymous with
the rise of global supply chains. The movement of
shipping containers on the world’s oceans is
growing, and the economies of many parts of the
world are tied to the efficiencies associated with a
single box moving from a producer in one country to
a consumer in another country. The rapid growth of
global trade has lowered the cost of goods in many
parts of the world. Subsequently, it has placed
unprecedented demands on container ports and the
surface systems that serve these ports.
The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway has a
rich history of being an economic driver for Eastern
Canada and the U.S. Midwest.  As the Great Lakes
Region has attempted to strengthen its role in global
commerce, the potential for increased waterborne
movement of containers into the Great Lakes has
long been of interest to port agencies and their
municipalities. There is a perception that the direct
movement of containers by ship into a Great Lakes
community will be beneficial to the local economy
and allow it to more effectively participate in global
trade.
However, it is very important for policymakers to
have an understanding of both the opportunities for
container shipping, and the barriers and issues with
such services.  A lack of understanding of these
points can lead to missed opportunities and/or the
potential for significant expenditures of time and
money on unrealistic projects.  Over the last 40
years or so many ports and local government
entities have expended large sums of money and
resources on consulting studies, service subsidies
and other efforts to attract container services to the
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Lakes.  This paper seeks to clarify the opportunities
and obstacles for such services so as to provide for
more informed decisions by policymakers and
political leadership.
This research examines the current state of container
shipping in the Great Lakes, and its potential for
growth.  First, a background on containerization,
commerce on the Great Lakes, and container
shipping on the Great Lakes is presented. This
section is followed by a review of Great Lakes
container shipping traffic levels and an analysis of
this traffic.  Then, an analysis of various issues that
are likely to impede scheduled container services is
reviewed.  The next section then suggests what
services might be viable. The paper then offers
some conclusions on the state of container shipping
and the potential for direct scheduled international
container services.
BACKGROUND
Containerization
In 1956, American businessman Malcom Mclean
loaded the first standardized containership in the
Port of Newark, NJ bound for Houston, TX. The
event was met with criticism at the time but would
later come to mark the beginning of a revolution in
global trade (Donovan, 2004). The advent of the
containership has been credited as a catalyst for the
growth in global trade that the world has seen in the
last 60 years. In an empirical analysis of
containerized shipping data from 1970-1992,
Bernhofen, El-Sahli, and Kneller found that
containerization had a statistically significant impact
on the growth in trade amongst industrialized nations
(2015). While containerization has allowed for more
cargo to fit onto ships, much of the gain in efficiency
has been from shorter loading and unloading times.
A study done by McKinsey found that before
containerization, a dock worker could load 1.7 tons
of cargo per hour onto ships. Five years after
containerization, this number rose to 30 tons per
hour, a tremendous increase in productivity.
(McKinsey, 1972). While not all ports have been
able to reap the benefits of containerization, it has
helped to expand global commerce through a
reduction in prices and increases in efficiency
(Notteboom, Rodrigue, 2008).
Throughout the 21st century, containerization and
container ports have continued to grow throughout
the world. Table 1 shows the volume of traffic
moving through the fifteen largest ports in North
America. Also shown is Halifax, which is #24 on the
list. The largest container port in the world is
Shanghai, which set a world record moving more
than 40 million TEUs1 in 2017.  In addition,
Singapore and Shenzen each handle more than 25
million TEU’s annually.
Commerce on the Great Lakes
The Great Lakes have a storied history of
transportation stretching back hundreds of years.
From the fur trade to the lumber trade, to the iron
and copper booms of the 19th century, the St.
Lawrence and the Great Lakes have played an
important part in the development of the region.
(Taylor, Roach, 2007). Stretching from Montreal,
QC in the east, to Duluth, MN in the west, the
waterway spans 2,342 miles (Figure 1) (Dimitrascu,
Higginson, 2007). Historically, the Great Lakes
have primarily transported bulk commodities such
as iron ore, grain, coal, and aggregates. These
trends have held true to the present day with the
primary commodities transported during the 2016-
2017 shipping season being grain, iron ore, coal,
and dry bulk (SLSMC/DC, 2017). These
commodities are carried by a combination of Laker
vessels, and ocean going ships. The inter-lakes
shipping industry is highly reliant upon the domestic
steel industry (Dimitrascu, Higginson, 2007). The
decline in the domestic steel industry is a
contributing factor for the overall decline in inter-
lake traffic since the mid-twentieth century. Laker
traffic in the Montreal-Lake Ontario portion of the
Great Lakes system peaked in 1977 with 38.3
million metric tons, with oceangoing traffic peaking
in 1978 at 23.1 million metric tons (Taylor, Roach,
2007, SLSMC/DC, 1992). This compares to 17.6
million metric tons of Laker traffic, and 11.2 million
metric tons of ocean traffic in 2017.
Despite an overall decline in traffic, the Great
Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway still has a major bi-
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national economic impact. The waterway serves a
significant portion of both the United States and
Canada, with the GLSLB containing 27% of the
population of the United States, and 62% of the
population of Canada (Stewart, 2012). A 2011
study found that the waterway generates $35 billion
dollars in business revenues (Martin, 2011).
Container Services in the St. Lawrence Seaway
and Great Lakes Region
The St. Lawrence Seaway enjoys the geographical
advantage of having the shortest trans-Atlantic route
to Western Europe (Hull, 2015). Given that during
the 1960s, 70% of international maritime trade was
conducted on the Northern Atlantic trade route, the
St. Lawrence Seaway was positioned to benefit
from the advent of containerization (Guy, Alix,
2007). Manchester Liners was the first company to
establish a Europe to Montreal container route in
1968. They were then followed by companies such
as CAST, CanMar, and CP Ships. (Alix, Comtois,
Slick, 1999). Early on, companies experimented
with container shipping out of Quebec City.
However, due to the size of the port and market,
these operations soon moved to Montreal (Alix,
Comtois, Slick, 1999). Before long, Montreal had
established itself as the container shipping center of
the St. Lawrence Seaway.
As Montreal established itself as a major container
shipping center other communities began to explore
how they could extend containerization into the
Great Lakes region via feeder services to Montreal
or with scheduled direct container services with
European ports. This posed certain challenges,
including a shipping season of 9 months, as well as
constraints on ship size due to the lock and dam
system used on the St. Lawrence Seaway System
(Hull, 2015).  Nevertheless, companies such as
Manchester Liners established feeder service to and
from other Great Lakes cities and Montreal (Hull,
2015). As late as 1979, Manchester Liners was
running a container feeder service from Montreal to
Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, Milwaukee, and
Toledo (Globe and Mail, 1979). However, as
Mayer (1978) noted, this service went bankrupt
only a couple of years later. These ships faced stiff
competition from trucks and railroads that also
transported containers from the Midwest to
Montreal and other east coast ports. It was the
intermodal connections that made Montreal a great
container port, and at the same time limited
container shipping by water west of Montreal (Guy,
Alix, 2007). However, the combination of
comparatively low container traffic, limitations on
ship size, and intermodal competition kept larger
Lakes waterborne container operations from
developing in the latter half of the 20th century
(Mayer, 1978).
Despite this, ports around the Great Lakes have
been interested in scheduled container services,
which potentially could offset the loss of traffic from
domestic cargo. Over the years, news of potential
container service has made headlines in cities
including Milwaukee (Connole, 1987), Duluth (Belz,
2014), Chicago (New York Times, 1979), and
Muskegon (Watson, 2017).  Reports on Great
Lakes port studies of direct international scheduled
container services go back many years.  For
instance, in 1989, James Kellow, Director of the
Detroit/Wayne County Port Authority at the time,
said that “we believe we need regularly scheduled
liner services,” and that the “economics are there”
(Markiewicz, 1989).  In the mid 80’s, a study by
DeWin, a joint Detroit/Windsor port promotional
agency, outlined the potential for a Northern Europe
to Detroit/Windsor scheduled direct container
service using 500-600 TEU vessels (DeWin, 1989).
Like many other such efforts nothing developed.  A
similar 1989 report commissioned for DeWin
suggested a liner service that would generate large
profits.
More recently, in 2010, the Port of Toledo went as
far as to install two container cranes to try and
attract feeder service (Lavigne, 2013).  Currently,
the Port of Cleveland has invested time and
resources ($3.1 million in subsidies for 2500
containers over the season) in a scheduled container
service using the decks of bulk carriers, however
this service has recently seen significant drops in its
very limited volumes (Miller, 2018).  As of January,
2018 the Cleveland Port was working at negotiating
an extension of its contract with the carrier.  In
addition, in the 2015-2018 period, the Port of
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Muskegon has been working to develop cross-
lakes and linked international container services
(Stephen Kloosterman, Watson, 2017), although
the stated goal of services starting in 2017 has not
materialized.
GREAT LAKES CONTAINER
TRAFFIC TRENDS AND SERVICES
In order to understand trends in Great Lakes
container traffic over the years the authors obtained
traffic data from two principal sources—the US
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Navigation
Data Center and the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence
Seaway’s Annual Traffic Reports.  The USACE
data provides information on the number of TEU’s
at major ports in the U.S. These ports, in 2016,
handled over 36 million TEU’s with the Port of Los
Angeles being the busiest with almost 6 million
TEU’s handled. (See Table 1 for other large ports).
By contrast, all of the U.S. Great Lakes ports are
lumped together and typically are at or near the
bottom of the TEU Table.  For instance, in 2016, all
U.S. Great Lakes ports combined handled only
1,328 TEU’s—about 5 TEU’s per day on average
for the typical 280 day sailing season. This
compares to 15-20,000 TEU’s per day for Los
Angeles and 4,000 TEU’s per day for the Port of
Montreal.
All waterborne containers entering or exiting the
Great Lakes must pass through the St. Lawrence
Seaway. The St. Lawrence Seaway publishes an
annual report that shows the tonnage carried in
containers passing through both the Montreal-Lake
Ontario (MLO) Section of the Seaway and the
Welland Canal Section of the Seaway. The MLO
Section has much higher container tonnage due to
the location of container ports located near the
Montreal terminal area. As noted previously,
Montreal is a major container center ranked as 12th
busiest in North America. The MLO Section of the
SLS handled 58,605 metric container tons in 2017
whereas the Welland Section handled 12,557 metric
tons.  Much of the above traffic originates and
terminates in the Montreal-Lake Ontario Section of
the Seaway which means that it never makes it to
the Upper Lakes.
The graph in Figure 2 shows long term container
trends for the Welland Canal Section of the Seaway.
This provides evidence of the earlier attempts to
develop container traffic in the Great Lakes. In the
1978-80 period, there were 15,000-22,000 TEU’s
each year passing through the Welland Canal
Section into the upper Great Lakes.  These levels
generally declined to year 1999 when only 40
TEU’s were counted. The 21st Century continued
with extremely low levels of traffic with most years
less than 500 TEU’s and many years less than 100
TEU’s. This changed in 2014 due to initiatives by
the Port of Cleveland to develop regular sailing
schedules for containers and other traffic to and
from the Cleveland area.
The Cleveland port efforts mentioned earlier
provide an interesting study on traffic prospects for
direct scheduled container services in the Lakes.
Based on the SLS Annual Traffic Tonnage reports
for Cleveland, the authors calculated that the port
handled 825 TEU’s in 2014, 2,934 in 2015, 1,615
in 2016 and 1,256 in 2017.2  These values may
differ somewhat from local sources because they
assumed each TEU contained ten tons of cargo.
Overall, the Cleveland traffic declined 57.2%
between 2015 and 2017 despite substantial
subsidies to get the business started.  Additional
perspective on the volumes involved can be gained
by looking at the number of trains it would take to
move this traffic between Cleveland and the Atlantic
Coast.  For comparison purposes, about two 600
TEU trains (one each direction) could carry the
2017 combined full year traffic of 1,256 TEU.
The Cleveland traffic was in large part due to the
establishment of a monthly chartered ship between
Cleveland, Ohio and Antwerp, Belgium (Lavigne,
2013). The service, operated by Spliethoff, is
marketed as a niche shipping solution that can save
up to 4 days in transit time to Europe vs East Coast
ports (SeeNews North America, 2013). While it is
billed as the only container service in the Great
Lakes, it does not exclusively carry containers.
Spliethoff utilizes multi-purpose ships that can carry
bulk cargo as well as containers. The same ship that
operates on the Cleveland to Antwerp route
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delivered 20 containers of bulk equipment to the
port of Detroit in 2015 (Bonney, 2015).
ISSUES LIMITING IMPACTING FUTURE
GREAT
LAKES CONTAINER SERVICES
Absent major changes in the geopolitical and
economic climate, a number of issues stand in the
way of increased container shipping into and out of
the Great Lakes.  While no one obstacle is
necessarily insurmountable, taken together these
factors make it very difficult for scheduled container
services to operate.  These issues have been well
known to academics and policymakers for many
years.  For instance, Dr. John L. Hazard of
Michigan State University, a noted authority on
Great Lakes shipping, and a mid’ 60’s Assistant
secretary of Transportation for Policy, summarized a
number of issues in various mid 70’s-80’s
presentations and reports (Hazard, 1987; Hazard,
1988).  He mentioned Seaway problems for
container shipping related to augmented overland
competition (rail and truck), lock and canal size
limitations, the limited nine month shipping season,
and a move towards shippers favoring speed and
reliability of service with smaller shipment sizes and
inventories.  These issues are also well known to
more recent analysts of Great Lakes shipping.  For
instance, James K. Higginson and Tudorita
Dumitrascu (2007), in their article on Great Lakes
shipping, note many of the issues mentioned above,
and which we review below.
Following are some of the key issues:
Small Seaway Size Ships Could Not Compete
in the Trans-Atlantic Market
A major issue deals with ship size and the Seaway
size limitations.  Containerships continue to increase
in size and efficiency. OOCL recently completed the
OOCL Hong Kong, which can carry over 21,000
TEU’s. This ship is over 1300 feet long, has a beam
of 193 feet and draft of 45 feet.3 There are many
other ships being built, or recently built, in the
18,000-21,000 TEU range. By comparison, the
larger ships coming into the Port of Montreal are in
the 4,400 TEU range. A containership moving west
of Montreal would need to be much smaller
because of the dimensional constraints of the
Seaway. A container ship passing through the
Seaway into the Great Lakes would likely be in the
1000-1500 TEU range. The international shipping
community would classify this size ship as a feeder
ship.
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It would be difficult or impossible for these small
vessels to effectively compete in Trans-Atlantic
trade against the large ships that will serve the Port
of Halifax or the Port of New York/New Jersey, or
the medium size ships serving the Port of Montreal.
A small vessel requires a crew similar to a larger
vessel yet the larger vessel can carry 3-10 times the
number of TEU’s.  There has been discussion over
the years regarding expansion and deepening of the
St. Lawrence Seaway locks and channels.
However, that does not currently appear to be on
the horizon, and current efforts are being directed
towards funding to maintain Seaway infrastructure in
its present configuration.
Viable Trading Routes into the
Great Lakes are Limited
Another issue is that any container waterborne
movement into the Great Lakes would have to
capture traffic from the ports of Halifax, Montreal,
and New York/New Jersey. A container route into
the lakes could be most effective in capturing traffic
between these ports and European or
Mediterranean ports since it could provide a direct
movement into the North American heartland. In
fact, Halifax often markets its port as being at least a
day closer sailing distance to Europe then the Port
of New York/New Jersey. However, the adverse
distance associated with traffic from other parts of
the world (i.e., ships from southern points have to
travel far north around New Brunswick and the
Gaspe Peninsula to gain access to the St. Lawrence
River) appears to make this an unlikely move.
More Ships Are Required to
Service Great Lakes Ports
Due to the high fixed costs of today’s
containerships, owners prefer an operating plan that
gets as many trips as possible from a given vessel in
a given service. A service from Northern Europe
(e.g., Hamburg, Antwerp etc.) to Montreal takes
about 7-8 days—depending on the number of
stops. Cycle time including port time is about 21-
days—that is, a given ship will be able to depart
Montreal for Northern Europe every 3-weeks.
Weekly service would thus require three ships. If a
ship went beyond Montreal to Detroit or Chicago
additional time would be required given the longer
distances and sailing times — about one additional
week to Detroit and two additional weeks for
Chicago service.
o Three ships can provide a weekly service
between Montreal and N. Europe
o Four ships would be required to provide a
weekly service to/from Detroit
o Five ships would be required to provide a
weekly service to/from Chicago
These ships would have to be much smaller than the
ships serving only Montreal and all five ships would
have less capacity than just two larger ships leaving
Montreal. Twice weekly service would require
respectively 8 and 10 ships.
Service Levels Would Be Less
Than Currently at Montreal
Montreal currently is able to generate sufficient
traffic to offer very high levels of service to Northern
Europe with ships departing at least 3-5 times each
week. Close to daily departure opportunities make
this very attractive for companies involved in closely
timed low inventory  supply chain operations.
Weekly or bi-weekly service would be much less
desirable and would increase inventory and other
carrying costs. Further, it is difficult to see how such
a service could be competitive with Montreal,
Halifax, or the Port of New York/New Jersey given
the well-developed rail and truck networks
designed to service these ports.
Alternative Modes of Transportation
Provide Good Levels of Service
Railroads and trucking companies have developed
extensive intermodal service networks serving
Montreal, Halifax, and New York.  Both CN and
CP provide multiple daily train services from Detroit
and Chicago to dockside in Montreal. A container
loaded in these cities can be transported and loaded
on a ship in Montreal in 2-3 days and then be on the
way to Europe. This level of service and the
frequent sailings from Montreal offer shippers from
the Midwest the ability to regularly ship and receive
containers. There are similar intermodal rail services
from Chicago to the East Coast where again sailings
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are very frequent. The most time sensitive freight
could be trucked from Chicago to one of these
ports in less than a day if necessary and be on its
way to Europe. Weekly or twice weekly sailings
from Great Lakes ports would incur both longer
transit times and longer wait times for a ship.
Nine Month Season Makes
Competition Difficult
A very difficult problem is the three months in the
winter when the Seaway is closed. Shippers will
have to make alternative arrangements for this time
period and the other modes will be reluctant to offer
attractive rates for this type of seasonal service. The
railroads and truckers will not maintain an inventory
of locomotives, railcars, and trucks that cannot be
utilized fully throughout the year. As such, they will
try to convince the shippers that they would be
better off by contracting year-round with them to
take the traffic to Montreal or another port. Any
new service proposed for the Great Lakes will likely
find significant resistance from the railroads and
truckers to prevent them from switching a portion of
their traffic to ocean vessels coming to a Great
Lakes port. This could include initiatives to raise
rates on traffic on other routes.
The Harbor Maintenance Tax Would Add
Costs for U.S. Bound Containers
The U.S. imposes a .125% Harbor Maintenance
Tax (HMT) on the value of goods imported into the
U.S. by water. This Harbor Maintenance Tax is
used to provide dredging and other maintenance
activities at U.S. ports, channels, and harbors. This
tax is also used to pay for the operation of the St.
Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation —the
entity responsible for the operation of the two U.S.
locks on the Seaway.  This tax would apply to the
value of any containerized goods imported into a
U.S. Great Lakes port. For example, the owner of
a container containing $100,000 of merchandise
would have to pay U.S. Customs $125 for that
container.  This tax only applies to goods entering
the U.S. by water—it does not apply to goods
landed in Montreal and trucked or railed into the
U.S.  It would however apply to any goods landed
at an east coast U.S. port. The HMT gives the ports
of Montreal or Halifax and the surface modes that
serve them a cost advantage over east coast U.S.
ports or container ships coming into the lakes to
service U.S. ports. Containers tend to have higher
value products compared to the other traffic and the
HMT would affect them more than other types of
cargo.
POTENTIAL CONTAINER SERVICES
Given the above barriers, aside from niche shipping
services, conventional container services do not
appear to be viable in the Great Lakes because of
size constraints and the difficulty in competing in the
trans-Atlantic market with much larger ships.
However, it may be possible to trans-load
containers from a larger vessel to a smaller Seaway
size vessel at Halifax or Montreal. This type of
“short sea shipping” is common in Europe and may
have some application in North America.  However,
rail and truck services are much more efficient in
North America and whether feeder type services
could compete is not clear. Another issue relates to
whether trans-loading costs at the transfer port
could be kept low enough to make the concept
viable.  None-the-less, this is where there may be
some possibility of services that can compete.  But
many of the above issues also create problems for
cross-lake feeder services.  For instance, the nine
month season is a very large impediment to a viable
commercial operation.
CONCLUSION
With the exception of niche shipping services serving
specific markets, the authors do not believe there is
significant potential for conventional container ship
service into the Great Lakes. The smaller vessels
that could fit through the Seaway could not compete
in the trans-Atlantic trade with the much larger ships
serving Montreal, Halifax, and New York. Further,
the extra time involved in serving ports such as
Detroit and Chicago and the infrequent service from
these ports would not be attractive to shippers.
They are accustomed to almost daily service
between major eastern ports and Northern Europe
as well as efficient rail and trucking services to and
from these ports. The three-month winter closure of
the Seaway would be a major problem for shippers
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and the high rates they would pay the railroads or
truckers during this period would further negate any
economic advantage. The Harbor Maintenance Tax
is a further economic obstacle for containers landing
at U.S. ports especially as compared to containers
landing at Montreal and moving by rail or truck to
the Great Lakes Region.
There will always be containers moving on the Great
Lakes as incidental or project related cargo.  There
may in fact be an opportunity to increase this
business particularly in certain specialty or low
volume areas where containerization makes sense.
There may also be the potential for certain types of
short sea feeder services for containers moving up-
bound from Halifax or Montreal into Lake Ontario
or possibly Lake Erie. A Canadian port would have
an advantage since it would be exempt from the
HMT. These feeder services, if economically viable,
would likely be low volume compared to existing
volumes currently moving by rail and truck.
However, regularly scheduled transatlantic container
services face many challenges that make them very
unlikely given the cost structure and service
dimensions offered.  Even with subsidies, these
services are unlikely to succeed.  While there have
been many studies and efforts over the last 50 years
to initiate scheduled container services none have
been proven viable.  While the current Cleveland
service continues, traffic levels have declined from
earlier years even with subsidized operations.  Given
this record, it is critical that policymakers have an
objective analysis of the current traffic levels,
competition, obstacles, and potential for such
services.  Otherwise there is a risk of significant
expenditures of time and effort on proposals that are
not viable.
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(Footnotes)
1 TEU means a “Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit” and is the common way of measuring cargo activity at a given
port even though some containers may be longer than twenty feet.  For example, a 40 foot container would
be counted as two TEU’s.  A 20 foot container (TEU) has a maximum gross weight of 52,910 pounds per
international standards.  This results in a tare maximum weight of 48,000 pounds.  Most containers weigh
considerably less.
2
The SLS Traffic Reports report metric tons in containers. The authors converted this to short tons, and
assumed ten tons per container. This process allows comparisons with USACE and other U.S. sources that
use short tons.
3 The Seaway can accommodate ships with a maximum dimension of 225.5 meters long (740 feet), 23.8
meters in breadth (78feet) and 9.1 meters draft (30 feet).
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A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCE
Terrance L. Pohlen, University of North Texas
ABSTRACT
Managers require measures spanning multiple enterprises to increase supply chain competitiveness
and to increase the value delivered to the end-customer. Despite the need for supply chain metrics,
there is little evidence that any firms are successfully measuring and evaluating inter-firm
performance. Existing measures continue to capture intrafirm performance and focus on traditional
measures. The lack of a framework to simultaneously measure and translate inter-firm performance
into value creation has largely contributed to this situation. This article presents a framework that
overcomes these shortcomings by measuring performance across multiple firms and translating
supply chain performance into shareholder value.
INTRODUCTION
The ability to measure supply chain performance remains an elusive goal for managers in most
companies. Few have implemented supply chain management or have visibility of performance
across multiple companies (Supply Chain Solutions, 1998; Keeler et al., 1999; Simatupang and
Sridharan, 2002). Supply chain management itself lacks a widely accepted definition (Akkermans,
1999), and many managers substitute the term for logistics or supplier management (Lambert and
Pohlen, 2001). As a result, performance measurement tends to be functionally or internally focused
and does not capture supply chain performance (Gilmour, 1999; Supply Chain Management, 200 I) .
At best, existing measures only capture how immediate upstream suppliers and downstream
customers drive performance within a single firm.
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Developing and Costing Performance Measures
ABC is a technique for assigning the direct and indirect resources of a firm to the activities
consuming the resources and subsequently tracing the cost of performing these activities to the
products, customers, or supply chains consuming the activities (La Londe and Pohlen, 1996). An
activity-based approach increases costing accuracy by using multiple drivers to assign costs whereas
traditional cost accounting frequently relies on a very limited number of allocation bases.
REFERENCES
Manrodt, Karl (2003), “Drivers of Logistics Excellence: Implications for Carriers,” In 1. W. Wilson
(Ed.), Logistics and Transportation Yearbook 2003 (pp. 126-154) Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, Inc.
Coyle, John J., Bardi, Edward J. , and Novack, Robert A. (2004), Transportation, 6th ed., Cincinnati,
OH: South-Western College Publishing.
Wilson, J. W. (2003), “Adapting to the Threat of Global Terrorism: Reinventing Your Supply Chain,”
[On-line]. Available: httpll:georgiasouthern.edu/cobaJcenters/lit/threat.doc. Accessed: 11/12/03.
Revised August 30, 2011
Dr. John C. Taylor, Editor
Journal of Transportation Management
Vol. 28 No. 2
Delta Nu Alpha
Membership Application
PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Last Name First Name Middle Initial
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Company Name
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Primary Mailing Address   (Home/Office) Street/PO Box City  State Zip
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Office Phone Home Phone Fax Number
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
*Email Address (REQUIRED-this in the primary means of communication! Emails will be sent from
admin@deltanualpha.org)
Type of Business:
Carrier          Forwarder / Property Broker          3PL          Shipper          Student          Other  
Type of Carrier: Truck           Rail          Air          Expedited  
Membership Level:
Gold ($125 - Includes annual subscription to the Journal of Transportation Management)  
Silver ($75)          Student ($35)  
Subscribe to the Journal of Transportation Management alone for $50 domestic or $65 international  
Chapter number if known____________ Send me a membership certificate 
Payment Preference:  Check (Payable to Delta Nu Alpha)        Visa          MC         American Express  
Credit card payments can be made by going to deltanualpha.org and paying via PayPal.
Payment of Delta Nu Alpha dues satisfies your Chapter and National Dues requirements. Delta Nu Alpha dues
may be deductible as a business expense; however do not qualify as a charitable contribution.
Mail Application to:  1720 Manistique Avenue, South Milwaukee, WI 53172 or scan and email to
admin@deltanualpha.org.
